{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","id":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","uuid":"4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title":"Bodies in code  interfaces with digital media","normalized_title":"bodiesincodeinterfaceswithdigitalmedia","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"0415970164","isbns":["0415970164","0415970156","9780415970167","9780415970150"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":348,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Bodies%20in%20code%20%20interfaces%20with%20digital%20media","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/4f7053d9-6508-49c8-9dd8-ec4dc5dadd53/search"},"page":{"printed_page":99,"pdf_page":112,"physical_index":112,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"e0ff51b30b77ed6669938080934a84c5e4918a5124538cca77fef4d17d924eb2"},"chapter":"bodies in code","content":"This model of technics foregrounds the complementarity of the two forms of individuation at issue in Simondon's conceptualization and in Lozano-Hemmer's relational works: the individuation of the (human) individual and collective individuation. The latter—specifically, the form that Simondon calls \"transindividuation\"—allows us to grasp how a certain disembodiment (understood as the individual's constitutive coupling to the preindividual) is a dimension of embodiment, as we have been maintaining for some time now. (In Simondon's parlance, transindividuation would be said to resolve the paradox of the human individual as a form of embodiment that is constitutively disembodied.) It is from the standpoint of transindividuation—an embodiment that is super-individual and also necessarily technical—that the excess of the individual over itself, the excess of its (preindividual) potentiality over its (individual) actuality, can be seen to be a constitutive dimension of its embodiment as an individual. In this respect, transindividuation can be said to be the ultimate expression of the primordial écart. In transindividuation, the originary transduction of embodiment and technicity constitutive of the human comes to yield nothing less than a technical embodiment of the indivision of the flesh, a technically embodied commons in which my body acquires its autonomy only through its participation in a larger process of embodiment.\n\nThe model of technics as medium-for-individuation thus forms the strict correlate of a view of the human that refuses to divorce technicity from embodiment and that therefore embraces disembodiment as a dimension of embodiment and as a potential for its extension beyond the body. If this model invests the écart constitutive of the human as the operator of human-machine interchange, it thereby gains a vastly expanded space of embodiment capable of encompassing technical extensions of the (human) body no less than concrete materializations of informational potentiality.\n\nIn this respect, my effort to introduce technics into (indeed, at the very core of) Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh differs fundamentally from Gail Weiss' superficially similar attempt to position the écart as a “space of disincorporation that makes incorporation possible” (120). Insofar as it retains the separability of the body as body, Weiss' conception of technics is fundamentally a prosthetic one, on which technics befall the human from the outside and function merely to extend the scope of its proper embodiment. As what makes the disincorporation of this body possible, the écart opens a spaçe of noncoincidence outside the body (between the body and its outside) rather than an originary noncoincidence (the transduction of embodiment and technicity) within the body That is why, on her account, the écart is the condition that allows \"for human beings to interface' with machines, ... to become one with our familiar, mass-produced or even one-of-a-kind' prostheses (e.g., glasses, clothes, artificial limbs, moussed-up hair, cars, watches, etc.)\" (120). For Weiss, in sum, the écart names the condition for a prosthetic extension of the already individuated human being; from our Simondon-inspired perspective, by contrast, the écart expresses the originary technicity of the human, the condition that has now, with today's digital technologies, made real the co-individuation of technics and embodiment in the form of technically facilitated transindividuation.\n\nBODIES IN CODE\n\n99","previous_page":98,"next_page":100}