{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","title":"Digital Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2021022153","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","id":"50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","uuid":"50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","title":"Digital Capitalism","normalized_title":"digitalcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"2021022153","isbns":["2021022153","9781032119182","9781032119205","9781003222149","2405518376"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":343,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Digital%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/50b7f922-b940-4a05-8eb0-c4dc0d8ec9ed/search"},"page":{"printed_page":84,"pdf_page":98,"physical_index":98,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b7ecef6dab8e2dab4c8d976c6ea73afe215d859043791e446f58b04e7a2e1be4"},"chapter":"DIGITAL CAPITALISM","content":"Right-Wing Authoritarianism and New Nationalisms Online: Reified Consciousness on the Internet\n\nSince the new world economic crisis started in 2008, the predominant reaction has not been the strengthening of the political left, but the rise of new nationalism and rightwing authoritarianism (Fuchs 2018a). In many parts of the world, far-right, nationalist ideology finds crucial support among blue-collar workers. Morgan and Lee analysed the relation of voting behaviour and the occupational structure in the USA’s 1,142 geographical units (defined by the American Community Survey). The working class was in this analysis defined as consisting of lower-grade service workers, skilled manual workers, unskilled manual workers, farmers, agricultural workers, and individuals without occupation whose highest educational attainment is a high school diploma. The analysis found that\n\nTrump’s gains in 2016, relative to Romney’s more generic performance as a near-loss Republican candidate in 2012, were most substantial in areas with the largest percentages of eligible voters who can be identified as members of the white working class. (Morgan and Lee 2018, 239)\n\nA complementary areal analysis of 1,142 geographic units shows that Trump’s gains in 2016 above Romney’s performance in 2012 are strongly related to the proportions of the voting population in each geographic unit that was white and working class. This strong relationship holds in the six states that Trump flipped, and it varies little across other types of states. […] the results […] of our analysis support the claim that Trump’s appeal to the white working class was crucial to his victory. (Morgan and Lee 2018, 240)\n\nSimilar developments of far-right, nationalist politicians and parties succeeding in elections can be found in many countries. In many cases, blue-collar workers strongly support these types of politics (see Fuchs 2018a), which is an indication that since 2008, there has been an intensification and extension of the tendency that nationalist ideology reifies blue-collar workers consciousness: a significant share of this part of the working class succumbs to the ideology that not class relations and capitalism, but immigrants, refugees and other nations are the cause of inequality and social problems. Nationalist and racist ideologies present a constructed conflict between nations and constructed conflicts between cultures as stratifying divisions in order to distract attention from the class conflict between capital and labour that has in the past decades resulted in rising profit and capital shares (the share of profits and capital in the gross domestic product) at the expense of the wage share (the share of wages in the gross domestic product) (Fuchs 2018a).\n\n84\n\nTheorists","previous_page":83,"next_page":85}