{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","title":"14410512","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787508681948","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","id":"522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","uuid":"522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","title":"14410512","normalized_title":"14410512","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787508681948","isbns":["9787508681948"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":466,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/14410512","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/522f0795-2372-4d31-8b2a-aee96946e042/search"},"page":{"printed_page":412,"pdf_page":431,"physical_index":431,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8b7d03dd3c6f562f92348a519e2653b7d7a7f78465ff7b25e06788e81fc1db17"},"chapter":"第3章英国政府的“一战”动员","content":"2o. Creel defended President Wilson's initial stance on the impending war during the 1916 presidential reelection as consistent with prior administrations that \"had the courage toholdtothe orderly diplomatic procedure of Washington and Adams, eventually winning justice without resort to war.\"In Wilsonand the Issues (New York: Century Company, 1916).\n\n21. Benito Mussolini, “Fascism,\" in Princeton Readings in Political Thought, Mitchell Cohen and Nicole Fermon, eds. (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1996), 572.\n\n22. George Creel, Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,1947),158. In fact, Creel portrayed the purpose of the Committee on PublicInformationasone of information distribution, and rejected the notion of propaganda as used by the Germans, which“had come to be associated with lies and corruptions. Our effortwas educational and informative only,for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that only fair presentation of its facts was necessary. Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920).\n\n23. Alan Axelrod, Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), I.\n\n24. Creel estimated the total audience members to whom the so5,190speeches were made in the Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information. Creel calculated a total of 755,190 speeches made from the 505,190 speeches made during the regular campaign, 70,00o speeches made during the early campaigns, and18o,000 speeches in the concluding periods ofthe campaign. Approximately 202,454,514 audience membersattendedthe regular campaign,with an additional40,ooo,000 audience members in the early campaigns and72,oo0,00oaudience members in the concluding periods of the campaigns, totaling 134,454,514 audiencemembers throughout the campaigns. Creel believed, however, that the numbers were far greater than the total 314,454,514 audience attendance calculated because he assumed that there were a considerable number of communities who did not report audience totals. As a result, Creel claimed that the incomplete or lack of reports “received justifies an estimate of final totals of a million speeches heard by four hundred million individuals.\" Though Creel's estimates were based on incomplete figures, theywould not be completely unreasonable given that there had been atotal of thirty-six distinct national campaigns and a growing attendance of moviegoers at the time.\n\n25. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917–1919 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 152.\n\n26. When creator James Montgomery Flagg later presented a copy of the poster to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Flagg revealed that he had used himself as a model for the image of Uncle Sam to avoid paying a modeling fee. The real-life inspiration for Uncle Sam, however, is somewhat more ambiguous and still in dispute. One popular theory links theinspiration for the national symbol to Samuel Wilson, a meatpacker from Troy, NewYork,who during the War of 1812 supplied meatto the American troops. Complying with labelingrequirements, Wilson marked each package with \"E.A.-U.S.,\" which likely stood for Elbert Anderson Jr., Wilson's contractor, and United States. Butlocal soldiers attributed the U.S. stamp as standingfor\"Uncle Sam\"Wilson.\n\n27. The case, Debs v. U.S., was one of three cases where the Court had upheld the Espionage Act convictions during the war that restricted free speech. In preparing his speech at Canton, Ohio, Debs had been careful to comply with the act and claimed to deliver a speech predominately for the purpose of “Socialism, its growth, and a prophecy of its ultimate success.\" Nonetheless, the Court identified parts of the speech, which sympathized and praised individuals convictedfor obstructing the enlistment service, and concluded that one could construe such parts as encouragement to those present to act similarly. As such, the Court found that “one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not . . . was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the opposition was so expressed thatits natural and intended effect would be to\n\n412\n\n注意力经济","previous_page":411,"next_page":413}