{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":100,"pdf_page":108,"physical_index":108,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"3677c04d0caa73fa871f503c02fa2cceac2d66722ab68f2989b09cdca731dcd5"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"3\n\n主观主义者对经验主张的解释的吸引力之一，就在于它总能使激进的怀疑论成为不可能，因为怀疑论依赖于对于经验主张—科学的或更加普通的的内容的客观的解释，从而感受到了在它们与其经验基础之间的逻辑缺口。主观主义的一个新近例子，通常被视为超越过时的主客区分的一种途径，就是被称为“内在实在论”的观点，依据这种观点，我们那看似客观的世界图景应当被理解成本质上是我们语言和观点的一种创造性产物，而且我们信念的真理应被理解为这种观点的观念发展中的幸存物。正如普特南所主张的，如果真理只是“理想化的理性的可接受性”，①如果“可接受性”意味着“对我们来说的可接受性”，那么在推理过程和世界之间的逻辑缺口也就消失了。\n\n这种立场为我们的经验主张增加了一种限定，对此我相信这是与经验主张的内容不一致的，就像逻辑的主观主义与逻辑的内容不一致一样。进而，使这种限定具有本义的唯一途径就是借助于这样一种有关世界以及我们在其中的地位的观念，其本身并非是主观的，但按照它，作为一种对照，我们真实信念的整个系统却是主观的。如果我们希望采纳将我们自己的思想置于其中、并能对自然规则的需求作出回答的这样一种世界观，这就必须不带有这样的限定，并服从于能够应用于别处的事物究竟是怎样的推理过程而不仅仅是一个“内在”的观点。\n\n100\n\n理性的权威\n\n①参见 Reason, Truth andHistory(Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981),Putnam对于数学和逻辑明显地也持有同样的观点，但我们在此仅限于经验理性的讨论。","previous_page":99,"next_page":101}