{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":122,"pdf_page":130,"physical_index":130,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"71f8414e9361641f13b4e88927ca33d38aa6dc86d46a09ee0c57c99bc16caaae"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"基本的论题在于解释的规则，因为否认人们具有这种二阶的愿望是没有任何用处的：问题在于它们到底是不是动机的真正来源或只是我们的这样一种动力的表现，即是对于某些理性的要求的认可。可以对理论的理性也可作出类似的观点。例如，我们关于构成式假设三段论的信念显然不是决定我们接受依赖于构成式假设三段论的演绎论证的一个未经理性考验的假设：毋宁说，这只是对于这种论证形式有效性的一种认可。②\n\n问题在于：在处理不同时间的愿望和兴趣时，对关于审慎的一致性的“愿望”，我们是否可以说出类似的事情？我认为这是可以的，而且，如果人们试图将审慎仅仅看成是一个人偶然产生的愿望，也即是众多愿望中的一个，那么，关于这一愿望适当性的问题就不可避免地会再次表现为一个规范性的问题，其答案也只能借助于原则本身而得出。规范性不可能被心理因素所取代。\n\n122\n\n理性的权威\n\n① A Treatise of HumanNature , book 2, part3, sec.3(L. A. Selby-Bigge,ed.，OxfordUniversityPress,1888)，p.416.我担心在实践理性的讨论中,不可避免地要再次谈论这个谨慎的主题。\n\n② 见BarryStroud,“Inference,Belief, and Understanding”,Mind88(1979),p.187：“就每一个命题或一系列命题而言，关于它的信念或接受包含于一个人以另一信念为基础而相信一个命题，就一个信念建立在另一个信念之上而言，这并不只是所接受的一个进一步的命题，而必须有另外一些东西。”","previous_page":121,"next_page":123}