{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":126,"pdf_page":134,"physical_index":134,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"856990477ff6adc924b5954598da39edce00efb71e605a682d0b25064ad658f2"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"更重要的是，就实质的方面而言，我并不认为主观主义者的计划能够合理地得以实行。无论如何，对于审慎的理性化作出一个批驳的心理学解释是不可能的。有人这样假设(这似乎相当合理)，提供未来的倾向有其维持生存的价值，它在我们之中的出现则是自然选择的结果。正如任何其他的本能一样，我们在此仍然必须决定按照这种方式去行动是否合理。就某些生物学上的自然倾向而言，无论它们是动机性的还是智力的，有充分的理由对此加以抵制或限制。就这看上去并非是对审慎的动机的正确反映(除非我们将其局限于道德理性)而言，这表明它们不能仅仅被视为没有任何理由的愿望。如果它们真是这样的话，它们就不能像它们所明显地做到的那样给我们以行动的理由。①对理性主义者来说，承认这样一点将永远不会是理性的，即认为审慎只是行为一致性的一种形式，对此他碰巧给予关注，尽管这并没有任何理由，而且，如果他并没有实际地加以关注的话，也没有理由这样去做。\n\n这种空洞的假说即在这种无条件的意义下不存在理由只有从优于其他可能性的分离的自我观察的观点看才是可接受的；正如在其他地方一样，我认为它也无法通过这样的检验。\n\n126\n\n理性的权威\n\n①关于情感化的愿望或偏好其本身永远不可为行动提供理由的一个十分有说服力的论证可见Warren Quinn,“PuttingRationality inItsPlace”，载他的Morality and Action(Cambridge University Press, 1993)。","previous_page":125,"next_page":127}