{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":133,"pdf_page":141,"physical_index":141,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"edf337a170317e816ba6428837a1518cdf966376f91078e827813bf0249088ae"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"此处可以与理论理性的作用作一直接的类比，后者应用了关于信念形成的普遍标准以使我的思想能够与客观信念的相一致的体系相协调，这一体系其他人也是可以共享的—这也就是通常所说的真理。理性就是努力使自己成为真理的地区代言人、并依此正当地行动。自由要求自己把握自己，并从外在于我们自己的角度，在思想和行动中，为像我们这样高度的偶然的、特定的个人选择这样一个方向，这是从我们内部永远无法达到的。\n\n这一图景与休谟的以下论点直接相悖：将理性局限于思想、并认为它不能直接应用于行动。按照后一观点我们可能超越自我而发展出关于世界是怎样的一种较为真实和较为客观的概念，但这一超越对于我们的行动仅仅具有工具性的影响—表明我们如何能够更加有效地依据始终完全是视角性的动机去采取行动。即使当关于事实的客观性观点将我们引向了与其他人的实际的协调性，相应的动机也完全是个人的。\n\n但是我相信休谟的这种观点是站不住脚的。即使是像霍布斯所提出来的那类的道德体系，它建立在对共有的自我利益(collectiveself-interest)的理性建构的基础上，肯定了作为其支撑点的自我利益的理性化。这也就使其卷入了与什么是理性的其他概念的竞争之中。\n\n六伦理学\n\n133\n\n① Critique of PracticalReason, pp. 30,155 – 159.","previous_page":132,"next_page":134}