{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":140,"pdf_page":148,"physical_index":148,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ef7e4c72c6ad986d64deadc64443daaf932eb7938f63d7c3f46ab25d6cd811a2"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"优先性理论或者说以权利为基础的理论与最大化、聚合性理论之间的矛盾冲突，事实上就是在关于什么是解释无偏见的个体间关注的最普遍要求的最佳方法这一点上的冲突。①这一论题在当前异常令人注目且颇多争议，我不打算进一步讨论它。我之所以介绍它，仅仅是作为道德理论的更大的实质性问题的一个例子，一个坚决反驳主观主义或相对主义的解释的实例：这一问题要求我们去寻找正确答案，而不是依赖于我们的情感或我们的共同体的共识。\n\n一旦我们承认存在某些在应用中是十分普遍的、与他人相关的理性，我们就必须寻找一种能限定其内容及其组合原则的方法。这不是一种第一人称的事业。既然已经认定肯定存在有一些，就一个较大的范畴而言，我们就应努力去找出这些理性—这也正是回答以下问题的一个普遍适用的方法，即“在这样的情境下，怎么做才是正确的？”这只是原先我们所面临的客观判断这样一个任务的继续，即我们从非个人的观点出发，去询问我们是否有任何理由去做任何事情这样一个问题，从而做出了最初的反思时所面临的一个任务。为了回答这一问题，仅仅询问自己的倾向是不够的；我必须尝试着去得出一个判断。这种判断常常采取道德直觉的形式，但这并非仅仅是主观的反应，至少就意图而言：它们是关于什么是正确的一种信念。\n\n140\n\n理性的权威\n\n①另一可能的选择见ChristineKorsgaard的论文“The Reasons WeCan Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Values”,Social Philosophy and Policy10, No.1, 1993。","previous_page":139,"next_page":141}