{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":17,"pdf_page":25,"physical_index":25,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ef3d387fadf966f613527f3dd26edd4458172aa0054490d462d665e13340c5fa"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"这种类型的反驳应当说十分古老，但它们看上去有必要不断地加以重复。普特南曾富有洞察力地评论道：“这是所有不协调的思想似乎都有的一种诉求。”尽管他曾长期与主观主义调情，普特南却又非常有力地重申了这一评论对于相对主义的不协调性也是适用的。①询问是关于真理的还是关于意义的普遍意义的主张适用于它自身，这通常是一个很好的策略。许多理论，如逻辑实证主义，经过这种检验将会立即被排除。尽管相对主义的自我驳斥是一个熟悉的论点，但却仍然是有效的：不采用理性，我们就不能批评某些我们自己的理性主张，而在另一情形下，这种理性也同样阐述和支持着那些所提出的批评。这或许将导致理性上可辩护的判断领域的缩小，但不会导致其消失。那些假定的理性的信念服从于外部的诊断和批判的过程将必然会使某些一阶推理实践的形式支配这一过程。主观主义的概念总是需要客观的框架，在其中主体被定位，它的特殊观点或回应得到描述。我们不能完全脱离辩护的立场，它促使我们去寻找客观的基础。\n\n二我们为什么不能从外部来理解思想\n\n017\n\n① “Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized\",载 Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers,vol.3 (Cambridge UniversityPress,1983)。关于不 协调的思想的评论出现在同一著作的第194页。也可参见 PetervanInwagen， Metaphysics (Westview Press, 1993), pp.65 –68。","previous_page":16,"next_page":18}