{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":21,"pdf_page":29,"physical_index":29,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d3bab58f690c21ff963309e22049d2e639aa3445dbca44f3fc2b93a46a01cfe4"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"2\n\n我将以这种方式来解释笛卡儿关于我思(cogito)的观点。①它揭示了当人们从外部看自己，并认为人的信念本应该是由那些不能对它们进行辩护或确认的原因所产生时，就会限制那种自我批判。这种渐进的破坏性的批判的过程所揭示出来的是对于这样一种能力不可避免的依靠，这种能力产生并理解所有怀疑论的可能性。认识论的怀疑论，就像选择性的相对论，不可能不隐涵地依赖于理性思想的能力：它借助于与证据相容的各种逻辑可能性的理性界定得以继续，对此理性并不允许我们作出选择。这样，怀疑者逐渐达到了关于自己的这样一种概念：他处于一个无法看穿与其自身关系的世界之中。但作为争论产物的怀疑论不可能是全部。在我思中通过揭示出对此类疑问的限制，对理性的依靠得到了清楚的指明。真正的哲学观点不存在于笛卡儿关于他存在的结论(一个比他后来所依靠的要狭窄得多的结论)之中，甚至也不存在于某些绝对确定性的发现之中。毋宁说，这里的关键在于笛卡儿揭示出某些我们不可能超越我们自身来进行思考的思想。我认为他是对的但我同时认为他还可以比他所做的更一贯地去支持这一原则。\n\n二我们为什么不能从外部来理解思想\n\n021\n\n①尽管“思”是一个哲学的罗尔沙赫测验(Rorschachtest),由此人们可看到自己的迷恋。","previous_page":20,"next_page":22}