{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":31,"pdf_page":39,"physical_index":39,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"50d932a799fe5a4ad302494c443c7cf7fcde66a63518a34ef60ca0e37b7ab8f4"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"她并对维特根斯坦进行了赞扬：\n\n从而维特根斯坦的语言概念包含了一种非基础主义的认识论，后者表明客观性(有效的判断)和理性化(有效的推理)都建立在共识之上乍看起来是理论性的，但最终则是实践性的。②\n\n罗蒂则用以下的方式提出了同样的论点：\n\n我们不可能找到一个天钩把我们从诸如对“按照其本来面貌与实在相对应”之类观念（something）的纯粹一致纯粹赞同中解脱出来…实用主义者会倾向于用愿望去代替客观性—一种与超越我们自身所处的共同体的实在相接触的愿望并伴随着追求与那个共同体关联性的这样一个愿望。③\n\n如果不仔细审视的话，这类观点就具有一种自明的气氛，这或许也就说明了为什么这种观点在哲学圈子外要比在哲学内部要更为流行。但如果我们认真去看待它们的话，人们就会发现它们与这些哲学家打算“奠基”客观性的这种共识是不一致的。那些形成科学或数学信念的人们所一致同意的是那些真实的东西，它们的真实，与我们是否同意它们是真实的无关—更进一步说，使它们为真的东西，并不仅仅是因为我们同意说它们是真实的！对付这种普遍主观主义口号的唯一方法就是将它们转变成关于算术、物理学或别的什么的特殊的、实质性的主张，并看它如何能够成立。我相信它常常会与所考察的话语中的表述的内容相矛盾，从而其可信性就要比在直接争论中所显示出来的小得多。\n\n二我们为什么不能从外部来理解思想\n\n031\n\n① Realism and Imagination in Ethics (University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p.37.\n\n②同上书，p.40。\n\n③参见Rorty 的一篇文章，“Science as Solidarity”，in Objectivity，Relativismand Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.38 - 39。","previous_page":30,"next_page":32}