{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":35,"pdf_page":43,"physical_index":43,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"704c026c98b2f54e25a6a6fedfb0bd17a7985b66430280417c89b0c04be69196"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"替代性概念框架的观念在此也帮不上任何忙。有些类型的思想我们是不可以或缺的，即使作为一种思考的动物，当我们力图从外部对自己作出思考时，也是如此。在对其他可能的思考的动物作出思考时，我们同样也摆脱不了这些思想。所以替代性的精神或者概念框架这一观念在使我们远离这些思想方面是没有任何用处的：它们的内容会挫败任何一种将它相对化的企图。①最后，我相信在智力空间中将不会给视角主义者留下任何地盘。\n\n二我们为什么不能从外部来理解思想\n\n035\n\n①这与Davidson关于替代性概念框架的观念的批评并无本质的不同。尽管Davidson的结果是由解释的条件引出的，这并不仅仅涉及用我自己的精神去看其他人的精神—这听上去要更加主观性一点。毋宁说，这是某些关于世界的思想与作为解释的条件的推理形式的实际内容：如不符合这些条件，任何东西都不能被看成思想。见 Donald Davidson,“On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”，载于他的Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford UniversityPress, 1984)。","previous_page":34,"next_page":36}