{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":57,"pdf_page":65,"physical_index":65,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"66a8066c788fb67ffefd6bd115999ff915152997ae3e22e075000f2e6ad76e0c"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"我们认为我们必须找到某些事实，对它的认识无须要求我们已经在谈论和理解一种语言，以及这样一些规则，后者将告诉我们，在掌握了所说的事实以后，说什么就是正确的。我们所熟悉的关于一个特定表达的意思的日常表述不可能起到这样的作用。它们实质性地用到那些已经“具有了生命”的词语，它们已经有了意义，从而它们就不可能以一种正确的方式去解释任何一个词语是如何获得意义的，或是如何被理解的。①\n\n我们应当找出某种办法去克服想要超出我们的思想这样一种永久的愿望，十分清楚的是，对维特根斯坦的最好的诠释已经为我们提供了这样做的某种途径。科拉·戴蒙德是提出过这样一种主张的一个诠释者，她对维特根斯坦关于传统的哲学研究的立场作了如下的解释：\n\n促使我们作出哲学解释的要求源自这样一种立场，在此我们似乎是居高临下地去看待我们与某种实在，某种事实或真实的可能性之间的关系。我们认为我们用关于它的问题意指某些事。我们的问题是用日常生活中的记号构造起来的，但我们通常提出与解答问题的方式、我们的实践、我们的兴趣、我们的推理与探究的形式所采取的都是一种“破布”(rags)的立场。我们自己的语言构造，在摆脱了它们的日常功能的限制之后，欺骗了我们：这种错觉的一个标准形式就是将哲学看成是一个探究的领域，并对此按照我们所熟悉的意义去加以理解。①\n\n三 语 言\n\n057\n\n①\"Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community\", R. Haller and J. Brandl, eds. , Wittgenstein — Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14h International Wittgenstein-Symposium (Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990), p. 35.","previous_page":56,"next_page":58}