{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":60,"pdf_page":68,"physical_index":68,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"53baf7baf8717fa27b934861c14600ff568aaad82c31c7ac71a719f349f6c7a0"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"也许除去在我们对这些表达式的普通理解中已包含的东西以外，并不存在关于意义边界更为深刻的理解。但这样一来，理解就无法在维特根斯坦推荐的作为去神秘化工具的关于我们的实践的事实性描述中得到充分的表述。我倾向于说数学语言的无限边界只能通过参与这种生活形式从它的内部去理解。这意味着甚至就生活形式而言我们也不能通过从外部去描述它的实践从而达到理解。这种解释的次序与维特根斯坦通常的诠释(或误解)的次序恰好相反：我们语言共同体的遵从规则的实践只能通过我们思想的实质内容得到理解—例如，算术的实践。不然的话，这就是无用的仪式。我们不能通过将其看成自然的历史中的对象来理解它们。\n\n060\n\n理性的权威\n\n①The Realistic Spirit, p. 69. 她所暗示的是Wittgenstein 在Remarks on theFoundations ofMathematics(Blackwell，1956)第325页上的一段话：“哲学中没有经验主义和实在论，这是最困难的事。”","previous_page":59,"next_page":null}