{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","id":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","uuid":"6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title":"理性的权威","normalized_title":"理性的权威","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787532763450","isbns":["9787532763450"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":171,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E7%90%86%E6%80%A7%E7%9A%84%E6%9D%83%E5%A8%81","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/6254e091-fea7-4580-ad1e-08ddba85762d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":96,"pdf_page":104,"physical_index":104,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1e693ce1db5e740d1d67e0370757de6c83662d6d8aa959c4c5f9c5d2bf50ab68"},"chapter":"The Last Word理性的权威","content":"就这一方法而言，存在有两种潜在的主观主义的指责。首先，对规则的需求本身不能合理地得到辩护，也不能与一种自明的必然性，如算术和逻辑，相对应。从一种主观主义者的观点看，科学与通常的经验推理过程所共同依赖的自然统一性的假设，只不过反映出我们对于某种世界图像的心理需要，而不是一个可以被用来获取“独立于精神”的真理的本质上可靠的工具。\n\n096\n\n理性的权威\n\n① 参见 Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (Pantheon Books,1992), pp.136- 147。 Ban van Frassen Laws and Symmetry (Oxford UniversityPress，1989)一书中也突出强调了对称在科学理论形成过程中的作用。但他认为它们的目的仅仅是经验的充分性，而不是关于自然的客观地为真的法则的表述。我仍然认为他相信我们所追求的经验的充分的理论就是可能客观地为真的理论。\n\n② 关于这一论题的一个具有吸引力的讨论可见(GeraldHolton)的“Mach，Einstein and theSearch forReality\",载Thematic Origins of Scienti fic Thought(HarvardUniversityPress，1988)。Einstein最终拒绝了Mach的现象主义而接受了Planck的实在论。Planck将科学的目的描述成“物理学图像从独立智力的个体性中的彻底解放”(转引自Holton，Die Einheitdesphysicalischen Weltbildes,第245页)。","previous_page":95,"next_page":97}