{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","title":"人工智能哲学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7532740544","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","id":"7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","uuid":"7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","title":"人工智能哲学","normalized_title":"人工智能哲学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7532740544","isbns":["7532740544"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":501,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/7f418071-0fdc-4a5a-a4c5-82dd1979d9c2/search"},"page":{"printed_page":348,"pdf_page":356,"physical_index":356,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"cc317a1d16ac7eb0a22d263d0b0ac70e7c47ff16000d0a484035e156b21017e6"},"chapter":"人工智能哲学","content":"即使我们总是同时意识到但暂时无关紧要因而一直完全不被注意的那种……背景，仍然根据它隐含的有效性在发挥作用(Husserl1970:149)。\n\n因为胡塞尔坚信可以使共享的背景像一个信念体系那样外显，所以他先于他的时代提出了AI可能性的问题。在讨论了一个形式公理系统可以描述经验的可能性，同时指出这样的公理和原素系统—至少像我们在几何学中所知道的—不能描述像“扇贝形”和“透镜形”这样的日常形状之后，胡塞尔留下这个关于这些日常概念是否仍能被形式化的问题没有解决。(这与提出有关人们是否能将常识物理学形式化的AI问题而留下它没有解决的情况是一样的。)在承继莱布尼兹关于建立全部经验的数学的梦想时，胡塞尔又写道：\n\n迫切的问题是……是否不可能存在……一个用纯粹而严密的理念代替直觉资料的、同时可以……作为……经验数学基本手段的理想化过程(Husserl 1952:v.134)。\n\n但是正如海德格尔所预见的那样，对日常生活作出完全理论叙述的任务其实比最初预想的要困难得多。胡塞尔的课题遇到很大的麻烦，一些迹象表明明斯基的课题也遇上了麻烦。在尝试说清楚主体对日常客体的表述的各个成分的二十五年间，胡塞尔发现，他不得不把越来越多的主体对日常世界的常识性理解包容进来：\n\n人工智能哲学\n\n348","previous_page":347,"next_page":349}