{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title":"形而上学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7100011361","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","uuid":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title":"形而上学","normalized_title":"形而上学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7100011361","isbns":["7100011361"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":383,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BD%A2%E8%80%8C%E4%B8%8A%E5%AD%A6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/search"},"page":{"printed_page":211,"pdf_page":215,"physical_index":215,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"291c22250acaa7c9abd10ee09e941592e097184c6e3015e434054892e1338680"},"chapter":"形而上学","content":"这道理，学术应从事于最高科屬之研究。这些.最后將归結于“实是与元一”；因为这些在本休上为各个原理之基始，而涵融着万物；倘“一”与“是”消灭，則万物亦当与之俱灭；因为每一事物莫不在自30申其为“-”为“是”。但“一与是”各当以其差異为云謂，科历則云謂于事物之所同，不云謂其所異，凭这样的命意，我們似乎不能拿“一与是”当作科屬和原理。但較簡單的若說比較复杂的为更近于原理，則科屬中的最低品种既較科屬为簡單，（因为品种不可区35分，而科屬則可分为許多品种，)那么与其認为科屬是原理，毋宁以品种为原理。若說品种是在科屬之所同处立異，而由这差異以破C60a坏科屬的范圍，那么科屬应較近于原理；因为事物之能包容另一事物的破环性者便应是那另一事物的原理。①这些与其它类此諸問题是令人迷惑的。\n\n章二\n\n又，我們需要假定有某些脱离各个个体的事物，而我們这門学5术所研究的正是这些事物？但个别事物为数无尽；事物之脫离个体而独立者，或为科屬或为品种，而我們这們学术拜不研究这些。为什么不可能研究这些問題，这在上面已說明了。②在可威觉本体（卽这世界中的本体）之外是否需要假設一个可分离的本体，抑或就將可成觉本体看作是智慧所关切的实在事物，这一般是难言  \n10的。因为，我们似乎在寻觅另一类本体，而这正是我們的問題所在一是否在辜物自身以外另有不屬于可感覚事物的独立存在一假如真有这样一些本体相应于可感覚事物，却又是脫离它們的.那么这又得詢問那些种类的可感觉本体才会有这些相应的本体？何  \n15以人們会假設人与馬較之其它动物或一般无生物更該有这样相应\n\n1060a\n\nK2\n\n①参看卷B，998:20-999a23.\n\n②見1059b24--38。\n\n211","previous_page":210,"next_page":212}