{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title":"形而上学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7100011361","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","id":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","uuid":"88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title":"形而上学","normalized_title":"形而上学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"7100011361","isbns":["7100011361"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":383,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%BD%A2%E8%80%8C%E4%B8%8A%E5%AD%A6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/88efeb70-2043-4122-a461-fbf8384bb0fc/search"},"page":{"printed_page":218,"pdf_page":222,"physical_index":222,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"5747aafdc8471c04070464eb0ff82f82e82938f30eda82090ad0c66c108ef68b"},"chapter":"形而上学","content":"K6\n\n10有真是非，必將拒絕这些完全破坏合理語法的異說。\n\n章六\n\n普罗塔哥拉亦會有类似上項想法的言語：他說过“人是一切事物的計量”，其意謂各人所見便是真实。若然，同一个别事物于  \n15此人为美者，可以于彼而为丑，其它以人为度量之事物情形往往如此，苟以此为凭，則同一事物便將可是可非，可善可惡，而一切相反敍述均將同屬真实。我們若于此說溯其由来，將可解其迷惑。此意所本盖一部分出于自然哲学家之教义，而另一些事例則出于世  \n20俗寻常之見，世人于同一事物固或喜或厌，或以为甘者或以为苦，各因所見不同而作不同之想。②\n\n“凡物必出于物，无物不能成为有物”，此通則几乎为一切自然25哲学家所公認。可是，倘先有全白者在，白就不能产生，而非白若先在，这却无妨于白的产生；因此辯难者这就可以說，先为不白，今而为白，白固由不白者来；若是，則其先必白与非白雨存于此物。\n\n30可是这疑难是容易祛除的；我們已在“物学”③中講明事物由无成有，与由有成有兩項不同的意义。④\n\n对于辯难兩方面的意見与印象若作等量齐观，当是幼稚的；雨35方必有一方錯誤。这是明显的，問題起于威覚；同一事物实际幷不1063a会于此人味甜，而又于彼味苦，如其有别，其中一人的味觉当已受損或有所变改。若然如此，大家就該以其中的一方为度量事物的·标准，而不用那不正常的另一方。于善惡、美丑、以及类于此者，亦5然。那些执持着我們所反对的那种意見的人，正象用一手指压在下眼瞼而看見了兩手指，然后又示人以手指只有一个，于是他主張二与一相同(这于另一位不自干扰其视觉的人，一手指看来就是一手指).①\n\n1062b\n\n①見“殘篇”1。参看1053bl脚註。\n\n②参看卷Γ，100916—16，22-30。\n\n③“物学”卷一第七至九章；“成不論”卷一，317b14—319b5。\n\n④参看卷T，1009a30—36\n\n218","previous_page":217,"next_page":219}