{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","title":"从“解剖政治”到“生命政治” 福柯政治哲学研究","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208147485","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","id":"8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","uuid":"8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","title":"从“解剖政治”到“生命政治” 福柯政治哲学研究","normalized_title":"从解剖政治到生命政治福柯政治哲学研究","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208147485","isbns":["9787208147485"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":336,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BB%8E%E2%80%9C%E8%A7%A3%E5%89%96%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E2%80%9D%E5%88%B0%E2%80%9C%E7%94%9F%E5%91%BD%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E2%80%9D%20%E7%A6%8F%E6%9F%AF%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/8c70ffdd-8a8c-4694-a2ec-203e499f30b0/search"},"page":{"printed_page":43,"pdf_page":52,"physical_index":52,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"040e524268e60da9b4de8cb1f87894b262f66f2acb5f2f90982eba5a744f0505"},"chapter":"第一章主体的真相","content":"福柯断定，对于法国那些从马克思主义、精神分析和语言学角度尝试重新思考主体问题的人们来说，康吉莱姆对科学史和哲学所做的研究之所以具有决定性意义，是因为康吉莱姆秉承卡瓦耶斯概念哲学传统断然拒绝现象学的主体理论。“现象学曾将身体、性、死亡、感知世界引入到分析领域；大写的我思在其中一直占据中心位置；无论是科学合理性，还是生命科学的特殊性，都不能危及其奠基作用。而康吉莱姆正是以一种关于差错(erreur)、关于生命体的概念的哲学，作为另一种探讨生命概念的方式，来与这种关于意义、主体和实际经验的哲学相对立。”①康吉莱姆与卡瓦耶斯一样崇尚一种斯宾诺莎式的无笛卡尔我思的哲学，主张我思应该是复数的、非人格化的。卡瓦耶斯批评胡塞尔现象学的意识哲学过分使用了笛卡尔我思，断言现象学并没有为数学内容确立存在的必要性和变化的必要性。\n\n第一章主体的真相\n\n① Michel Foucault, “Interview avec Michel Foucault\", Dits et écrits , I, 1954— 1969, Paris: ÉditionsGallimard, 1994, p.653.\n\n②Ibid., p.518.\n\n43","previous_page":42,"next_page":44}