{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title":"断裂的时间与“异质性”的存在——德勒兹《差异与重复》的文本解读","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787308056465","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","uuid":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title":"断裂的时间与“异质性”的存在——德勒兹《差异与重复》的文本解读","normalized_title":"断裂的时间与异质性的存在德勒兹差异与重复的文本解读","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787308056465","isbns":["9787308056465"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":361,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%96%AD%E8%A3%82%E7%9A%84%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4%E4%B8%8E%E2%80%9C%E5%BC%82%E8%B4%A8%E6%80%A7%E2%80%9D%E7%9A%84%E5%AD%98%E5%9C%A8%E2%80%94%E2%80%94%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E3%80%8A%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D%E3%80%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%96%87%E6%9C%AC%E8%A7%A3%E8%AF%BB","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/search"},"page":{"printed_page":219,"pdf_page":228,"physical_index":228,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"11565e478194e179b21d2b797ba8971842728894a4f79bbb604d5164f982a965"},"chapter":"第四章","content":"第四章在“重复”中断裂和生成的存在\n\n219\n\n这一思想是我在阅读了张一兵先生的《回到马克思》一书，并结合德勒兹在《尼采与哲学》一书中关于需要的观点而阐发的。参见张一兵：《回到马克思》。德勒兹在其《柏格森主义》中也提出需要是他者的思想，需要作为否定性时刻的标记，是指要突破事物的连续性，保留所有与其相关的客体而放弃其他。这是从缺乏的意义上理解的需要。参见《康德与柏格森解读》，社会科学文献出版社 2002 年版，第140页。参见 Gilles Deleuze:Dif ference andRepetition,1994,by Columbia University Press,p77.\n\n0 参见 Gilles Deleuze: Difference and Repetition, 1994, by Columbia University Press,p77。\n\nGilles Deleuze; Dif ference and Repetition, 1994, by Columbia University Press, p77.","previous_page":218,"next_page":220}