{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title":"断裂的时间与“异质性”的存在——德勒兹《差异与重复》的文本解读","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787308056465","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","id":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","uuid":"920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title":"断裂的时间与“异质性”的存在——德勒兹《差异与重复》的文本解读","normalized_title":"断裂的时间与异质性的存在德勒兹差异与重复的文本解读","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787308056465","isbns":["9787308056465"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":361,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%96%AD%E8%A3%82%E7%9A%84%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4%E4%B8%8E%E2%80%9C%E5%BC%82%E8%B4%A8%E6%80%A7%E2%80%9D%E7%9A%84%E5%AD%98%E5%9C%A8%E2%80%94%E2%80%94%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E3%80%8A%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D%E3%80%8B%E7%9A%84%E6%96%87%E6%9C%AC%E8%A7%A3%E8%AF%BB","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/920f76e4-c853-4e20-9c82-a745945fe63b/search"},"page":{"printed_page":97,"pdf_page":106,"physical_index":106,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"fedc09cbfca61989cc2454949064de1b928b87f1e0b105e462a91bf244639dd9"},"chapter":"第二章","content":"文本生产的结果就是“他者”。德勒兹在考察了康德哲学关于概念自身的内在矛盾后，他认为，与其说那些对概念的不确定性理解就是概念的本质，还不如说可以更好地被理解为在某种事物中的“他者”。他指出，这种概念的不确定性的“他者”并不是在本质中，而只在沉思和观察它的那些精神中。德勒兹指出，这也就是为什么说本质是被精神或者是被概念疏远的与自身相对立的“他者”。与这些本质的概念相符合的是那些它们自身缺乏记忆的客体，也就是那些在德勒兹看来是既不拥有也无法在自身中收集它们瞬间所拥有的(记忆)。那么，什么是本质的重复的原因？是断裂之外的断裂，是心灵的动力(momentanea)。新奇的重复通过它自身再现它的精神：精神具有一种记忆或者习得了习惯，就是在一般性上构成概念并吸取某些新事物的能力，就是从它沉思的重复中减去新事物的能力。\n\n第二章 差异——哲学的代言者\n\n097\n\nGilles Deleuze: Difference and Repetition, 1994, by Columbia University Press, p13.","previous_page":96,"next_page":98}