{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title":"[人文科学译丛]德勒兹概念  哲学,殖民与政治","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787564922757","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","uuid":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title":"[人文科学译丛]德勒兹概念  哲学,殖民与政治","normalized_title":"人文科学译丛德勒兹概念哲学殖民与政治","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787564922757","isbns":["9787564922757"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":413,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E4%BA%BA%E6%96%87%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%91%E4%B8%9B%5D%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5%20%20%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%2C%E6%AE%96%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%8E%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/search"},"page":{"printed_page":313,"pdf_page":327,"physical_index":327,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"328c560e2bbedebfa8e5f37d8f253a1a7608820a46e54bc69b3faccd5d4122c2"},"chapter":"第八章德勒兹与民主","content":"在哲学中我们回归永恒价值，回归知识分子作为永恒价值之看守人这一观点。我们回到本达(Benda)，埋怨柏格森在试图思考运动时，背叛了他自己的阶级，即教士阶级。现在，是人权提供了我们的永恒价值。人们认为非常抽象的是宪政国家和其他观念。正是因为所有这一切，思想受到束缚，从运动角度进行的任何分析都受到阻碍。（P166，121-122)①\n\n芒格从这些话中得出了德勒兹以原则为由反对人权的论点。人权是永恒的、抽象的。因此，它们是超验价值。它们假定有一个普遍的、抽象的权利主体，该主体与任何特定的人都不一样，不能简化为独一的、现有的人物。因此，德勒兹拒斥像人权这样的抽象概念，因为它们会阻碍内在性平面上的运动和实验，还有思想和政治实践中的运动和实验。\n\n第八章 德勒兹与民主\n\n313\n\n① 同样，在1988年与雷蒙德·贝卢尔和弗朗索瓦·埃瓦尔德的谈话中，当被问到为什么他不像福柯一样参与人权运动时，德勒兹回答说：“如果你们说的是创立新的超验性形式、新的普遍概念，恢复作为权利承载者的反思主体，或者建立一种交际主体间性，那么这并不是哲学的进步。”(P208，152)","previous_page":312,"next_page":314}