{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title":"[人文科学译丛]德勒兹概念  哲学,殖民与政治","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787564922757","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","id":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","uuid":"938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title":"[人文科学译丛]德勒兹概念  哲学,殖民与政治","normalized_title":"人文科学译丛德勒兹概念哲学殖民与政治","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787564922757","isbns":["9787564922757"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":413,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E4%BA%BA%E6%96%87%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%91%E4%B8%9B%5D%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9%E6%A6%82%E5%BF%B5%20%20%E5%93%B2%E5%AD%A6%2C%E6%AE%96%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%8E%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/938ffece-6e9d-4ccb-a834-1221ead96536/search"},"page":{"printed_page":375,"pdf_page":389,"physical_index":389,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"4183e1f4bff1a2b89c9f4439edc27b1c3d0de2255adbad5f7b63b9b7e9586215"},"chapter":"第八章德勒兹与民主","content":"正义观念之基本原则发生改变的一个原因在于：在构想何为正义原则时，它不可避免地依赖于“当前的知识和现有的科学共识”。罗尔斯在《正义论》中承认：“随着既定的信念发生改变，正义原则—看起来认可这些原则是理智的——可能也会改变。”(Rawls 1999b，480[1971，548])他指出人们怎样曾经认为一种固定的自然秩序支持一种等级社会，并提出摒弃这一信念引起了向其两个正义原则发展的趋势，以此作为例子。他后来的表述明确表明其目的是为没有自然等级制度残余的现代民主社会提供一种正义理论。理查德·罗蒂立足于罗尔斯的这一妥协，认为他作为方法的正义观念是“彻底的历史主义的和反普遍主义的”(Rorty 1991b，180)。\n\n但罗尔斯不愿意接受这一结果。在《康德式建构主义》中，他强调这些原则依赖于一种关于人的道德观点和一种关于良序社会的相关理想。他将我们认为处于原初状态的各方具有的一般信念发生的变化可能会导致正义原则发生改变这一可能性描述为“只是一种为了解释建构主义观点的本质而特别指出的可能性”(Rawls 1999a，352)。他认为关于人性和社会的普遍信念发挥的作用只是表明在“一般说来良好的人类生活条件”下这些关于人的理想是否可行，是否可以实现：\n\n第九章 乌托邦政治哲学:德勒兹与罗尔斯\n\n375","previous_page":374,"next_page":376}