{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","title":"Speed and Politics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"1584350407","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","id":"95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","uuid":"95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","title":"Speed and Politics","normalized_title":"speedandpolitics","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"1584350407","isbns":["1584350407","9781584350408"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":175,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Speed%20and%20Politics","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/95af29fb-5c71-443d-9382-1c666228579d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":"I 1 6 1","pdf_page":161,"physical_index":161,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"864e3e4aa664811adde0c2e2f26e4ae50558ce5aedf7bb228c7e68f120c31fd1"},"chapter":"SPEED AND POLITICS","content":"In the face of this curious contemporary regression of stragetic arms limitation agreements , it is wise to return to the very principle of deterrence. The essential aim of throwing ancient weapons or of shooting of new ones has never been to kill the enemy or destroy his means, but to deter him, in other words, to force him to interrupt his movement. Regardless of whether this physical movement is one that allows the assailed to contain the assailant or one of invasion, \"the aptitude for war is the ap titude for movement, \" which a Chinese strategist expressed in these words: ''An army is always strong enough when it can come and go, spread out and regroup, as it wishes and when it wishes. \"\n\nFor the last several years, however, this freedom of movement has been hindered not by the enemy's capacity for resistance or reaction, but by the refinement of the vectors used. Deterrence seems to have passed suddenly from the fire stage, in other words the explosive stage, to that of the movement of vectors, as if a final degree of nuclear deterrence had appeared, still poorly mastered by the actors in the global strategic game. Here again, we must return to the strategic and tactical realities of weaponry in order to grasp the present logistical reality. As Sun Tzu said, \"Weapons are tools of ill omen.\" They are first feared and fearsome as threats, long before being used. Their ommous \" character can be split into three components :\n\nThe State of Emergency\n\nI 1 6 1","previous_page":160,"next_page":162}