{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","title":"技术与时间：1.爱比米修斯的过失","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544726863","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","id":"9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","uuid":"9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","title":"技术与时间：1.爱比米修斯的过失","normalized_title":"技术与时间1爱比米修斯的过失","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787544726863","isbns":["9787544726863"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":329,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF%E4%B8%8E%E6%97%B6%E9%97%B4%EF%BC%9A1.%E7%88%B1%E6%AF%94%E7%B1%B3%E4%BF%AE%E6%96%AF%E7%9A%84%E8%BF%87%E5%A4%B1","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/9b88d2f2-8eab-4576-8a52-82d9265ef4da/search"},"page":{"printed_page":300,"pdf_page":314,"physical_index":314,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"0536dc6bc3e800d24aaadb4b26661e7cee53473ac1e43d7a9536b5c184bbe8f9"},"chapter":"第三章“什么”的解脱","content":"度量“时间的超验性”加重了它的公众化(从而失去了时间的内在的和退避的性质)。时间既非主观也非客观：\n\n“它既不在内'也不在外’，它比一切主观性和客观性‘更古老’，因为它代表着这种‘更古老’的可能性本身的条件。”\n\n既然划分“谁”和“什么”的内在和外在的区分必须被消除，那么我们本应顺理成章地在这种区分之前来思考时间。事实并非如此，因为“谁”具有相对“什么”的优先性，所以“什么”永远不可能自身具有构造的意义。诚然，海德格尔推翻了胡塞尔的内在和超验的划分。自亚里士多德以来，“运用时钟观察”的世界时间总是被理解为一种从当即出发的延续流。对于时间的延续流图像的批判的基点是：“在把时间作为当即的延续的通俗的解释中，既缺乏日期性，也缺乏指意性。”但是他一点也不比胡塞尔(尤其不比《几何学的起源》)更加关注“什么”的动力。\n\n如果说“黑格尔的建树’的动力来自为建立精神的具体化[即在它进入时间之后]的概念而作的努力的斗争，那么，前面所述的生存分析则与其相反，它从一开始就进入实际被抛的生存的具体化'[……]，不是精神’落入时间，而是实际生存作为沉沦的生存，从原始、本真的时间性中‘落下’。但是这一落’本身也有其生存的可能性，这种生存的可能性是在一种时间性的时间化的形式中获得的，而且这种形式也是内在于时间性的”@。\n\n我们当然可以由此反驳海德格尔：根据这个逻辑，就应当把已经在此的(重新)构造性完整地加入“被抛”的具体性之中，这个观点只能从被重新考察的“实体-主体”的角度来思考。\n\n技术与时间\n\n《存在与时间》，第81节。\n\n6① 同上，第82节。\n\n300","previous_page":299,"next_page":301}