{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":114,"pdf_page":122,"physical_index":122,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"0d2471062c557d8893f0d669d66024fd095a2acb0e54990d44957b594f06d79c"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"How far off we are from inventing AGI is uncertain, but many working in the field of AI view it as inevitable. Ethem Alpaydin argues that, based on what ML systems can do today, it ‘will not be surprising if this type of learned intelligence reaches the level of human intelligence some time before this century is over’ (2016: xii). There are, however, more optimistic estimates. In a survey asking AI experts when they expected HLMI to be developed, the median estimate was a 10 per cent probability by 2022, 50 per cent probability by 2040, and 90 per cent probability by 2075 (Müller and Bostrom 2016). Another survey asking ML experts when AI will exceed human performance yielded similar results: 10 per cent chance of occurring within nine years, 50 per cent within 45 years, and 75 per cent within 100 years (Grace et al. 2018). This survey also asked granular questions about when AI will outperform humans in a particular skill, giving estimates for many different tasks, including translating languages by 2024, driving a truck by 2027, working retail by 2031, and writing a best-selling book by 2049. The ML experts believed that there is a 30 per cent chance of AI outperforming humans in all of these tasks in 45 years, and that all human jobs would be automated in 120 years.<sup>7</sup>\n\nAGI is actively pursued by corporate, governmental and nongovernmental interests. The actual invention of such machines may be one of the bleakest possible futures of capitalism for humans because, as we now critically discuss, such a machine could labour and therefore potentially also create value. Although being able to perform labour is a necessary condition for creating value, it is not a sufficient one. We therefore proceed analytically and consider the possibility of AGI labouring separately from whether it could create value.\n\n114\n\ninhuman power","previous_page":113,"next_page":115}