{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":116,"pdf_page":124,"physical_index":124,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"f874560a033c725b3c996c2ccfcda5b216fd5f47d3cb2f98ff3a59db86c073e5"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"Marx explains this difference with the concept of life-activity and argues that the ‘whole character of a species … is contained in the character of its life-activity’. Whereas an animal ‘is immediately identical with its life-activity … does not distinguish itself from it [and] is its life-activity’, humans are distinguished by having ‘conscious life-activity’ (2007: 75). One of the dividing lines Marx thus draws between humans and animals is that the former are conscious of what they do, while the latter are not. He reiterates this argument in Capital, stating that the conscious purpose behind what humans do ‘determines the mode of [their] activity’ (1990: 284). In turn, this consciousness gives humans ‘free play of [their] own physical and mental powers’ (1990: 284); they are therefore ‘free’ in their activity (2007: 75).\n\nWhy does consciousness grant human labour-power freedom? What does Marx mean by ‘free’? The implication is, of course, that in their activity animals are unfree. But why? This difference in relative freedom can be better explained by turning to two passages where Marx underscores the difference between humans and animals. Importantly, these passages also identify other mental capacities Marx argued were uniquely human. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx writes:\n\nAdmittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself and its young. It produces one-sidedly whilst man produces universally. It produces under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, while man freely confronts his product. An animal forms things in accordance with the standard and need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty. (Marx 2007: 75–6)\n\n116\n\ninhuman power","previous_page":115,"next_page":117}