{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":146,"pdf_page":154,"physical_index":154,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"131145aa06b983e5c47736edd9fa02fbd00212670d28df56d35ed043db8d0eda"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"This position raises important points about uneven and contradictory technological change within capitalism. Straightforward extrapolations from technological powers to social consequences are mistaken. However, to the degree that the ‘this isn’t happening’ view is based on a general scepticism about capital’s technological capacities, the past provides some ratification (no jet packs yet!) but also dramatic counterexamples (nuclear weapons, the internet, biotechnologies). Our analysis of actually-existing AI-capitalism shows increasingly pervasive corporate and state use of narrow, usually ML-based, AI technologies that are already objects of social struggle. More are being actively researched. That many of these will fail is certain; an AI bubble will probably burst. But in the longer term more intense and wider AI deployments seems likely, not just because of advances in technical innovation, but because of these innovations’ intersection with capital’s changing structural conditions, including the increased difficulties of advanced capital in accessing global cheap labour; tightening, and hence wage-raising, post-recession job markets; growing economic and military antagonisms between ascending and descending imperial powers; and the ruling class’s search for technological control over unrests arising from heightening social inequalities and deepening ecological catastrophe. There are compelling historical examples, from the fire and blood of primitive accumulation to the tumults of capital’s successive industrial revolutions, of how combined technological and social logics remake or unmake entire modes of production.\n\nThis brings us to the ‘it’s really happening, let’s speed it up’ position, aka the left-accelerationist or postcapitalist view of AI, which fuses impulses ranging from the philosophical to the pragmatic. This school of thought has behind it the weight of much of Marx and Marxism in seeing socialism as the inheritor of capitalist modernity and its techno-tools. Fully automated luxury communism, or postcapitalism, envisages a transition to socialism by reducing or eliminating the need to work and supplying a universal basic income. The xenofeminist wing of accelerationism sees a reduction in unwaged domestic toil by applying fourth industrial revolution technology to the home. The productivity generated by new technologies will create conditions of abundance that in large degree smother the need to replace markets with complex social planning mechanisms. Where planning continues to be required, for example in regard to ecological questions, intelligent machine networks monitoring outputs and inputs will be capable of solving the ‘calculation problem’ that baffled previous socialisms.<sup>1</sup> This might seem like utopian speculation, but such ideas are in play in recent left electoral politics. Left accelerationists (Srnicek and Williams), postcapitalists (Mason) and luxury automated communists (Bastani) are an important intellectual grouping for Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in the UK (Dinerstein and Pitts 2018; Pitts and Dinerstein 2017). We admire and respect this group’s grasp of the scale and speed of AI-related technological change in contemporary capitalism. Such changes lie at the core of an untidy nexus of social conflicts emerging around AI-related precarity, work monitoring and speed-up; surveillance; military and paramilitary AI applications; algorithmic discrimination; smart cities; and oligopolistic concentrations of digital power. However, we are critical of the left-accelerationist/postcapitalist strategy for addressing the rise of AI-capital (since one of the authors of this book has written in a similar vein [Dyer-Witheford 2014], these comments can be taken as self-criticism as well as criticism!). To explain our objections, we take a step back to discuss some theoretical considerations arising out of what has become known as ‘the reconfiguration debate’.\n\n146\n\ninhuman power","previous_page":null,"next_page":147}