{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":39,"pdf_page":47,"physical_index":47,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"f7d9846a699d3e11c994b48db48658f9a807251c948d1b70ac9e04ce8f74b3e9"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"Such state-capital interactions in the development of digital technologies were widely adopted beyond the US in the era of globalization following the end of the Cold War. While many theorists, both bourgeois and Marxist, declared the decline of the nation state, in actuality, capitalist globalization unfolded through the mediation of nation states whose activities characteristically involved the support and subsidization of the digital industries and infrastructures on which competitive participation in the world-market depended (Schiller 1999; Powers and Jablonski 2015). The so-called ‘Washington consensus’ governing globalization masked mounting antagonisms, in particular between a Cold War-victorious United States and the defeated ‘post-socialist’ Russia and China, which were compelled to capitulate to or compromise with US-led capitalism. In 2008, when the Wall Street crash manifestly weakened the US as imperial hegemon, these conflicts emerged more sharply in a flare up of economic and military rivalries to which contending nation’s plans for AI are now integral.\n\nUS AI development was already built on the basis of state-initiated infrastructures and technologies; leaders of AI research, such as IBM and later Google (Nesbitt 2017), have been supported by US defence-related funding: according to one report no less than 16 US government agencies fund AI development (Fabian 2018).<sup>4</sup> However, it was only in 2016 that the US Federal Government began formulating an overall National Artificial Intelligence R&D Strategic Plan. The Trump administration has named AI a national priority because of ‘its role in helping the U.S. lead in technological innovation as well as its role in information statecraft, weaponization, and surveillance’, while the President has made it clear that he will not ‘stand in the way’ of AI-capital by burdening it with regulations about the social or employment effects of AI (Future of Life Institute 2018). Amongst a variety of measures, the US Department of Defense’s announcement that it would invest up to \\$2 billion over five years towards the advancement of AI was prominent: use of ML in surveillance and for the control of ‘swarming’ drones and other semi-autonomous weapons appear to be a high priority (Scharre 2018). High-tech workers at Google and some other Silicon Valley companies have revolted against participation in military contracts – an important instance of resistance to AI we discuss in Chapter 2. Despite these protests, however, the Pentagon made clear that this was only the first phase of an ‘AI surge’ (Seligman 2018) that would include other projects such as the \\$10 billion to be spent over the next ten years for a special military cloud computing Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI).\n\nmeans of cognition\n\n39","previous_page":38,"next_page":40}