{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":49,"pdf_page":57,"physical_index":57,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b3a9a8e096afe214153a6e04fc1ae68a696bfd2cbb3e4d92cab9c77cb8289f86"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"In addition to large-scale industry requiring an ‘immense transformation’ in transportation and communications networks, it also required that machines could produce large quantities of uniform, precisely tooled machine parts: ‘Large-scale industry therefore had to take over the machine itself, its own characteristic instrument of production, and to produce machines by means of machines. It was not till it did this that it could create for itself an adequate technical foundation and stand on its own feet’ (Marx 1990: 506). Only when machines started producing parts for machines could machinery as such become a general condition of production, meaning it was available to all individual capitals, in adequate quantity and quality. This is not to say that every individual capital must adopt a particular new technology for it to be considered part of the general conditions; it is sufficient that individual capitals have access to it on a more or less equal footing. Competition will compel adoption; it will become part of the general conditions once it is widely used by a critical mass of individual capitals. This may be encouraged or even enabled by states, as for example in the 1990s when the US government fostered business adoption of the internet as an ‘Information Highway’ for commodity circulation (Schiller 1999). The high level of governmental interest in boosting national AI capacities suggests that states are already pushing for another revolution in the general conditions of production. Yet before we can discuss what this push might be a response to, or what form it might take, we need to outline the general conditions of production as they stand today.\n\nTHE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM\n\nMarx sketched out how the general conditions of production for the period of manufacture were transformed into those adequate for large-scale industrial production. Since Marx’s time, the capitalist mode of production has gone through at least two other notable periods: Fordism, defined by Taylorism and the assembly line, and the period that followed it, defined primarily by ICTs and logistics, which is most commonly described as post-Fordism (Hardt and Negri 2001). The lack of consensus around how to define post-Fordism is evident in the panoply of names that have been given to the same period: digital capitalism (Schiller 1999), logistical or supply-chain capitalism (Toscano 2011; Cowen 2014; Kjøsen 2016), and cognitive capitalism (Moulier-Boutang 2011). We recognize the amorphous quality of the term post-Fordism, and agree with many critiques made of it (see Amin 1994 for an early overview); and we particularly note that many theorists of post-Fordism have underplayed the continuities and overplayed the qualitative differences that this period has with Fordism. That being said, we also hold that it is evident that substantial changes have occurred since Fordism, such that the designation of a new period is worthwhile. Further, we suggest that we are perhaps entering a new period of the capitalist mode of production, beyond post-Fordism, which we refer to as actually-existing AI-capitalism. This, we suggest, may be seen as a middle phase of a larger mode of cybernetic capitalism (Robins and Webster 1988; Peters, Britiz and Bulut 2009; Tiqqun 2001) which tends towards fully developed AI-capitalism.\n\nmeans of cognition\n\n49","previous_page":48,"next_page":50}