{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","id":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","uuid":"a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","normalized_title":"人工智能和资本主义的未来","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9780745338613","isbns":["9780745338613","9780745338606","9781786803955","9781786803979","9781786803962"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":225,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E6%99%BA%E8%83%BD%E5%92%8C%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E4%B8%BB%E4%B9%89%E7%9A%84%E6%9C%AA%E6%9D%A5","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a2eab101-adfc-4a0d-8142-63a4d11cee02/search"},"page":{"printed_page":73,"pdf_page":81,"physical_index":81,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8f944900b29cd97453141cc72cb3c6d5c0a607c977b9e143be7e6f36579f9527"},"chapter":"Digital Barricades: Interventions in Digital Culture and Politics","content":"Globalization and digitization changed the balance of class power in capital’s favour. Around the world, labour’s share of GDP relative to that of capital steadily decreased, in rich and poor countries alike (Economist 2013). Then, in 2008, the planet factory burst into flames. Capital’s increasing focus on financial speculation culminated in the Wall Street subprime mortgage crash. Widespread contagion of financial systems, bank bailouts, austerity, recession in the global North and ramifying knock-on effects around the world followed. So too did social tumult. In 2011 a series of rebellions against inequality and insecurity – often in the form of public square occupations – ricocheted from Tunis and Cairo to Madrid and New York, and then to Istanbul and Rio de Janeiro, Tel Aviv and Kyiv.\n\nWhile these revolts initially indicated a burgeoning working-class recomposition, often drawing on new strata of post-Fordist cultural and technological workers and students, they were almost all unsuccessful; they fizzled out, were repressed, replaced one conservative regime with another, or imploded into civil wars and foreign interventions. They were followed by another wave of turmoil, driven from the right: the UK Brexit referendum, Trump’s 2016 US election victory, and the rise of neo-fascism across Europe, all propelled by resentments against capitalist globalization, racist hatred of migrants and minorities, and working-class anxieties around job losses and flagging wages.\n\nBoth the unsuccessful recompositionary moment of the Occupy movements of 2011 and the all too successful decompositionary neofascism of 2016 were symptoms of a weakened working class; but they also signalled an alarming instability within capitalism. The wave of corporate interest in AI, though long in the making, surfaced towards the end of this roller coaster of unrests. Machine intelligence was framed as the ‘answer’ to crisis. Thus consulting firm Accenture began a 2016 pitch for AI investment by acknowledging a ‘marked decline’ in the ability of capital to ‘propel economic progress’ and ‘sustain the steady march of prosperity enjoyed in previous decades’ before proclaiming that ‘AI has the potential to double … annual economic growth rates by 2025’ (Purdy and Daugherty 2016).\n\nParadoxically, the digital industries that enabled globalization were strengthened by its 2008 near-death experience. With Wall Street reeling and Main Street industries, such as the big three US automakers, mired in recession, ‘big tech’ was the one beacon of hope. Having survived the dot.com meltdown of 2000 by reincarnating as ‘Web 2.0’, digital capital was already on the ascent before the Wall Street meltdown. Google first offered stock market shares in 2004 and Facebook in 2006. Apple released the iPhone in 2007. It was, however, during the post-crash recession that these digital corporations, along with others such as Amazon, topped the lists of the most highly valued companies in the world, occupying positions previously held by giant energy and financial service corporations (Mosco 2017: 65). Even uprisings against global capital, hopelessly simplified as ‘Facebook revolutions’, could be interpreted as manifestations of a new digital order. The US return from recession after 2008 was a ‘tech-led’ recovery, during which the preconditions for ML were established: big-data-generating social media, web and smartphone use.\n\nautomating the social factory\n\n73","previous_page":72,"next_page":74}