{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","title":"动物与人二讲【无封面、版权页、目录页】","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","id":"a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","uuid":"a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","title":"动物与人二讲【无封面、版权页、目录页】","normalized_title":"动物与人二讲无封面版权页目录页","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":114,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%8A%A8%E7%89%A9%E4%B8%8E%E4%BA%BA%E4%BA%8C%E8%AE%B2%E3%80%90%E6%97%A0%E5%B0%81%E9%9D%A2%E3%80%81%E7%89%88%E6%9D%83%E9%A1%B5%E3%80%81%E7%9B%AE%E5%BD%95%E9%A1%B5%E3%80%91","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/a3d20d9f-08e6-48dd-8975-661ffa08f781/search"},"page":{"printed_page":89,"pdf_page":88,"physical_index":88,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"79580d7f34e27608ad1c158a483e1165c79353279ad788b26b7339802d835b68"},"chapter":"动物与人二讲","content":"心理介入其中，如同对生命个体生成的一次减缓，如同对这个发生的最初状态的一次幼态延续的扩大；当生命体没有完全实现、仍保留内在二元性的时候，就有了心理。如果生命体可以完全自我满足，并且在作为已生成的个体之中、在身体界限内部以及在与环境的关系中也完全被满足，那么就不会引发心理现象；但当生命不再能够统一包含并解决知觉与行动的二元对立，而是变成类似于知觉与行动组成的整体的时候，生命就成为问题。2\n\n从上述描述可以看出，心理的个体生成并不适用于所有生命体，只有在情感性（affectivité）不再能够通过转导实现个体生成时（情感性主要为动物所有），知觉与行动的功能才会让生命体重新处在亚稳定状态之中（知觉与行动主要为人所有），从而形成一个西蒙东所谓的更新的、更复杂的问题。然而，西蒙东立即在注释中做了一个十分重要的说明：\n\n译后记\n\n89\n\n1 Jean-Hugues Barthélémy, Penser l'individuation : Simondon et la philosophie de la nature, op. cit., p. 185.\n\n2 Gilbert Simondon, L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, op. cit., p. 163.","previous_page":88,"next_page":90}