{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","title":"导读德勒兹","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787562482765","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","id":"aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","uuid":"aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","title":"导读德勒兹","normalized_title":"导读德勒兹","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787562482765","isbns":["9787562482765"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":241,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%AF%BC%E8%AF%BB%E5%BE%B7%E5%8B%92%E5%85%B9","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/aad4d586-86fc-4d21-a20d-fd3da08aedc1/search"},"page":{"printed_page":2,"pdf_page":20,"physical_index":20,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b090f82db0303b97c24407b1ca6359333e9597e7672496f2838754a1b1e54301"},"chapter":"导读德勒兹","content":"但为何我们不能拥有这样一个知识的基础呢？为何经验(现象学)和语言(结构主义)都不能为我们提供某种基础呢？对于德勒兹来说，这个诉诸经验的问题就是我们倾向于为经验假定一些规范的或标准的模式，比如人类外在世界的经验。我们不得不忽视非人的(inhuman)经验(比如动物、无机生命甚至那些我们没有当下影像的未来经验)。为知识建立基础的问题在于任何描述这样一个结构的企图都不得不假装是外在的或在结构之上的。（结构主义人类学家就是这样做的:他们观察其他文化并描述它们的结构，但从来不问他们自身在知识中的位置是如何建构起来的。)假如我们想理解自身的语言结构，我们仍然会使用某些语言来解释它。即使“语言”这个术语已经建立在一个区分的结构之上:我们能够想象一种没有语言的总体语汇，但却可能拥有一种“符号”或“记号”的文化。德勒兹的伟大的问题和贡献在于他坚持差异和生成，反对结构主义。\n\n2\n\n导读德勒兹\n\n2","previous_page":1,"next_page":3}