{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title":"哈贝马斯著作集 包容他者","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208153554","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","uuid":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title":"哈贝马斯著作集 包容他者","normalized_title":"哈贝马斯著作集包容他者","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208153554","isbns":["9787208153554"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":389,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%93%88%E8%B4%9D%E9%A9%AC%E6%96%AF%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E9%9B%86%20%E5%8C%85%E5%AE%B9%E4%BB%96%E8%80%85","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/search"},"page":{"printed_page":118,"pdf_page":127,"physical_index":127,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"9f94a27ded13d42e29133e88199478cc4af8c6f1359cfbce964f48a246299d58"},"chapter":"包容他者","content":"注释：\n\n4请参阅罗尔斯：“作为公平的正义”(Gerechtigkeit als Fairness)，载其《政治自由主义》,第273—274页，注释20\n\n5托马斯·斯埃伦在“建构主义与功利主义”(Contractualism and Utilitarianism)一文中也从不同的角度批评了抉择理论的思路，请参阅A.森(A.Sen)、B.威廉斯（B.Williams)编：《功利主义及其超越》(Utilitarianism and Beyond,Cambridge,1982),第123页及以下诸页。\n\n6 罗尔斯：《政治自由主义》，第73页。\n\n7 罗尔斯：《正义论》(Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit,Frankfurt amMain, 1975), §25,第168页。\n\n8 同上，第169页。\n\n9 I.M. 扬：《正义与差异的政治》(Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton, 1990),第25页。\n\n10 请参阅奥尼尔(OnoraO'Neill):《理性的结构》(Constructions ofReason, Cambridge,1989)，第12章，第206页及以下诸页。\n\n11请参阅哈特(H.L. Hart):“罗尔斯论自由及其优先性”(Rawlson Liberty and itsPriority),载N. 丹尼尔斯(N. Daniels):《阅读罗尔斯》(Reading Rawls, New York,1975)，第230页及以下诸页。\n\n12请参阅W.欣施(W.Hinsch):“导言”，见罗尔斯：《政治自由主义》，第36页及以下诸页。\n\n13请参阅罗尔斯：“优先性”(Vorrang)，载《政治自由主义》，第178页及以下诸页和第196页及以下诸页。\n\n14 请参阅哈贝马斯：《道德意识与交往行为》(Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives handeln,Frankfurt amMain,1983);《话语伦理学》(Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik,Frankfurt amMain,1992)。关于话语伦理学在当代美国学术界的地位，请参阅本哈比(S.Benhabib)：“在亚里士多德与黑格尔的阴影之下”(In the Shadow ofAristotle and Hegel: CommunicativeEthics and CurrentControversies in Practical Philosophy),见《哲学论坛》(The PhilosophicalForum, vol.XXI,Winter,1989/1990)，第1—31页；此外还有：“专刊：普通主义与社群主义”(Special Issue: Universalismvs. Communitarianism),《哲学与社会批判》(Philosophy andSocial Criticism,14)，第3/4期，1988。\n\n15请参阅雷格(W.R. Rehg):《洞见与团结：哈贝马斯的话语伦理学》(Insight and\n\n118\n\n包容他者","previous_page":117,"next_page":119}