{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title":"哈贝马斯著作集 包容他者","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208153554","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","id":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","uuid":"ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title":"哈贝马斯著作集 包容他者","normalized_title":"哈贝马斯著作集包容他者","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787208153554","isbns":["9787208153554"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":389,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%93%88%E8%B4%9D%E9%A9%AC%E6%96%AF%E8%91%97%E4%BD%9C%E9%9B%86%20%E5%8C%85%E5%AE%B9%E4%BB%96%E8%80%85","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ab07c774-3ed2-48d8-8672-5c17d147d9d8/search"},"page":{"printed_page":128,"pdf_page":137,"physical_index":137,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"95a3b4ca4038a6394459364157897a9fd25093b20f2221bfc2a0d084411bd1ef"},"chapter":"包容他者","content":"另一方面，通过把政治和形而上学明确区分开来而达到回避的策略是否卓有成效，则是另外一个问题。罗尔斯最初采取的是康德式的前进策略；他在《正义论》当中提出了这样一项使命，即借助于“原初状态”来阐明“道德视角”。但是，“作为公平的正义”这样一种建构无论如何都要依赖于一种实践理性，它具体表现为道德人格的两种“高级能力”。在“杜威讲座”当中，罗尔斯进一步发挥了这种“康德主义的建构论”。这种建构论在他的《政治自由主义》第三章当中也有所涉及，但已有所变化，理性失去了其重要性。实践理性似乎被剥夺了道德的核心内容，沦落为一种合理性，依附于用其他方式论证的道德真理。至此，正义概念的道德有效性也就不再用具有普遍约束力的实践理性，而是用理性世界观的偶然性来加以论证，而且，这些理性世界观的道德内涵还是完全重叠的。不管如何，罗尔斯原来的正义概念与他现在的理论之间不是天衣无缝了。\n\n《政治自由主义》当中有两个相反的论证取向。“重叠共识”观念导致的结果是，康德式正义概念的理性要求被大大地削弱了。我想首先讨论一下如何重新分配政治正义性的合理性和世界观的真实性之间的论证负担，然后再深入探讨它们之间不协调的地方。不协调说明，罗尔斯迟迟不愿像对康德理论所要求的那样，使实践理性服从世界观的道德。\n\n128\n\n包容他者","previous_page":127,"next_page":129}