{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":101,"pdf_page":105,"physical_index":105,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"c40aaea2ca6d8701b660cf1dffb6d5a839064aaa85d5856ef3ccd81b9f6cb8d8"},"chapter":"第三章劳工向何处去？","content":"和“剩余劳动”。这两个概念必须加以研究，不仅因为它们的差异和关系是抽象劳动存在的原因，而且因为—一这是第4章的任务一一它们的差异和关系的产生，用萨特的话来说，构成了历史的“初级可解性”。\n\n本章的一个最重要的结论一一也是本文其余部分所强调的——可以通过以下命题来把握:在马克思中没有“超历史本体论”的位置，只有历史本体论。像劳动和需要这样的范畴，只有在一种生产方式和另一种生产方式之间的差异的层面上，才具有本体论上的有效性，这样，资本主义的人与封建的人是一种根本不同的主体(资本主义中的社会个人与production®)的其他模式中的社会个人是一种根本不同的主体)。然而，这并不意味着我们不能进行超历史的思考。就我们的目的而言，抽象劳动的特殊资本主义存在，正是允许我们以超历史的方式思考“劳动”、“需要”和“历史”的东西。简而言之(假设一个人坚持生产方式的本体论优先)，“超历史的”应该被理解为马克思的认识论范畴，而“历史的”是一个本体论范畴。因此，尽管本章——实际上是本论文的其余部分一—动摇了前两章所提出的主张的超历史基础，但它并没有使这些主张变得毫无意义。相反，它表明，资本主义生产方式是迄今为止在超历史水平上提出的思想的历史条件。因此，本章的精神不是要关闭“超历史的马克思”的可能性，而是要将他历史化。这一点很重要，因为历史时间的概念必须记录下资本主义之后社会和历史时间的可能性。我们需要超越历史的马克思，正是因为没有他就不可能思考共产主义。\n\n9 This point registerş the essential limit of Carol C. Gould' s Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social Reality (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1978). Drawing on the passages on the ‘social individual' in the Grundrisse, Gould attempts to create a transhistorically valid social ontology as the basis from which to think the historical development of social individuality. There is something sociological in the bad sense about a methodology such as this: Gould’ s manoeuvre effectively de-historicises the social in order to historicise the historical. Marx' s conception of a social individual is intelligible because of capitalism (as is the category of ‘society' ).\n\n101","previous_page":100,"next_page":102}