{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":13,"pdf_page":17,"physical_index":17,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"296339d94f249ee92b1fbae6662debcaf81c84c301816d557592b4f0e1d81cd7"},"chapter":"第一章唯物主义历史观:一种时间解读","content":"在《德意志意识形态》中，实践和poiêsis之间的固定区分被一种独特的历史哲学所维持。正如巴里巴尔所言，“从来没有任何有效的自由不也是一种物质转化，它不被历史地登记在外在性中。”但也没有任何工作不是自我的转化，好像人类可以在保持不变的“本质”的同时改变他们的生存条件。⁸在马克思看来，1845年以后，“唯物主义”如果要作为实践的和社会的唯物主义具有任何意义，就必须已经是一种历史的唯物主义。诚然，马克思的实践唯物主义在《费尔巴哈提纲》中引入了时间性，因为“感性的人类活动”是一个隐含的时间概念。同时，实践的时间性并没有被这些提纲所救赎。这种救赎留给了《德意志意识形态》，在《德意志意识形态》中，实践的时间性是以历史化的需要概念为基础的。由于《德意志意识形态》为《费尔巴哈提纲》的唯物主义提供了历史基础，它为劳动作为内在于需要的实践引入了一种独特的历史暂时性。《德意志意识形态》能让我们做到吗\n\nWilliam Haver’ s contention that in Marx, the mode of production is ontology. There is nothing outside a mode of production’ is only sustainable from the standpoint of the philosophy of time. William Haver, For a Communist Ontology,’ in The Politics of Culture: Around the Work of Naoki Sakai, ed. Richard Calichman and John Namjun Kim (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 107.\n\n7 Marx, Grundrisse, 205, 361. The latter quotation reworks Hegel’ s position in the Logic that matter is that which is indifferent to form.’ See Ġ.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic [1812], trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Alleņ & Unwin, 1969), 451. Still, it is unclear in this passage if the human is itself included within the realm of things' . Minus such inclusion, the indifference between living time’ and the temporality of things' cannot be historicised.\n\n8 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 40.\n\n13","previous_page":12,"next_page":14}