{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":144,"pdf_page":148,"physical_index":148,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"16e760cf4f1da463afe811c207595e34660473ee700e8f0266c7d12cec9fee22"},"chapter":"第四章《资本论》:思考历史的条件","content":"对象，因为它缺乏具体的充分性，而抽象的力量没有这种充分性就会产生。对黑格尔来说，流形不是概念的外在，而是概念的化身。因此，如果我们站在\"主词和谓词都有自我存在\"的立场上(这是康德的观点，因为他的先验主体gem是一个人的主体)，那么，\"包容\"就只是普遍事物对特殊事物或个体的应用，这是根据一种模糊的观念，即认为普遍具有劣等的性质，而置于普遍之下的。32黑格尔的问题不在于包容本身，因为三段论的理性，即辩证运动，都依赖于包容的关系，而在于他没有认识到，如果包容不是思维与内在的关系，那么它就什么也不是[Inhärenz]。也就是说，包容表明了这样一个事实，即普遍性和特殊性虽然以不同的方式彼此内在。 33\n\n马克思在《对黑格尔法哲学批判的贡献》中声称，黑格尔并没有问他对包容范畴的使用是否是“理性的、适当的包容模式”，尾注集合体认为：\n\nThe irony here is that it is just such a usage of this category that Marx himself goes on to develop. From the 1861-63 draft of Capital onwards, subsumption, for Marx, is the subsumption of the particularities of the labour-process under the abstract universality of the valorisation-process of capital. The abstract category, it seems, really does find itself a body. Marx’ s critique of German idealist philosophy is thus paralleled in his critique of capital. However, now the error is not on the part of the speculative philosopher, for it resides, rather, in capitalist social relations themselves. The abstract universal -value – whose existence is posited by the exchange abstraction, acquires\n\n32 Hegel, The Science of Logic, 629.\n\n33 The Endnotes Collective gives good commentary on the place of subsumption in Hegel’ ş Philosophy of Right, although they overstate the manner in which this place marks a tension in Hegel' s work more broadly. It is true that, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel in effect recreates the Kantian framework: he reproduces the sense in which the manifold is external to the pure categories of the understanding and thus subsumed under -subjected to -these categories. Here the universality of the sovereign’ s decision is not configured as inhering in, and thus constituted by, the particularities of civil society. This decision does not manifest itself as a concrete universal, but is rather a decision which imposes itself upon civil society, such that the executive power -namely the judiciary and the police -have animmediate bearing on the particular concerns of civil society and they make the universal interest authoritative over its particular aims.' G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right [1821], trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 189 (§ 287). Therefore, the particular interests which are common to everyone fall within civil society and lie outside the absolutely universal interest of the state proper.’ Ibid. 189 (§ 288). See http://endnotes. org. uk/en/ endnotes-the-history-of-subsumption (accessed 27 April 2015).\n\n34 In full: The sole philosophical statement Hegel makes about the executive is that he “subsumes\" the individual and the particular under the general, etc. Hegel contents himself with this. On the one hand, the category of “subsumption\" of the particular, etc. This has to be actualised. Then he takes any one of the empirical forms of existence of the Prussian or modern state (just as it is), anything which actualises this category among others, even though this category does not express its specific character. Applied mathematics is also subsumption, etc. Hegel does not ask “Is this the rational, the adequate mode of subsumption?\" He only takes the one category, and contents himself with finding a corresponding existent for it. Hegel gives a political body to his logic: he does not give the logic of the body politic.' See Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in MECW Volume 3, Marx and Engels: 1843- 1844 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 48.\n\n144","previous_page":143,"next_page":145}