{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":16,"pdf_page":20,"physical_index":20,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b2d76f6d9504abe9fbe5ef19973dca0c235911f3ebc2460f1eab2b381d4a68aa"},"chapter":"第一章唯物主义历史观:一种时间解读","content":"谅解。如果象马克思那样，认为迄今为止一切现存的唯物主义都不能主观地把握客观性、感性和现实性，那就等于反对康德，认为主体只能是人的感性活动本身，只能是实践。13正如巴里巴尔在《提纲》之后所断言的那样，“……唯一真正的主体是实践的主体或实践的主体，或者更好的说法是，这个主体不是别的，而是一直已经开始并无限继续的实践。 14\n\n从这种实践唯物主义中产生了两种结果，一种是明确的，一种是隐含的，每一种都依赖于另一种，并构成了与另一种关系的张力。首先，作为对认识论话语的明确的认识论批判，马克思的《提纲》积极地将主客体关系辩证法化，这样，感性的人类活动就会破坏主体与客体之间或“知者”与“被知者”之间任何自给自足的障碍。正是在这种背景下，沃素亭认为，主体和客体不是在实践之前预先构成的，而是在实践中“构成”的。15其次，马克思对主体作为实践的思辨性重新定义产生了一个(仍然隐含和不确定的)主张，代表了这一认识论话语的本体论基础。在这方面，主体和客体，无论是被定义为人类的代表能力[gemen]16和与之相对立的东西[Gegenstand]，还是辩证地呈现为两极的感性活动，在马克思中都成为本体论基本实践的认识论衍生。在他对一个明显的认识论问题的转化中，马克思创造了一个在认识论和本体论之间辩证地、不均匀地运动的实践概念。如果这个概念是现代认识论的主客体关系的基础，那么在巴里巴尔的“主体即实践”的表述中，“是”和“实践”不仅是哲学命题的联结词和谓词，而且在黑格尔之后，代表思辨的绝对同一性的辩证时刻，它不是实体的，而是关系本体论。\n\n13 Praxis implicitly stands in as the meaning of practice' in the Theses. Marx never outlines a concept of practice' as epistemologically or ontologically distinct from praxis, in the Theses or elsewhere, but it is possible to suggest that the movement from an ontology of praxis to an ontology of production – that is, the movement from the Theses to The German Ideology -marks the development of a historical-ontological concept of practice within which the differentiation of practice from praxís, and the inseparability of praxis and poiêsis, is established. After The German Ideology, practice is not just ontologically basic to the subjectobject relation of modern epistemology, as is offered by the Theses, but historically-ontologically basic to the praxis-poiêsis relation as well. It is Marx' s specification of practice as labour, as the social production of the means of life, that secures the removal of the separation between praxis and poiêsis.\n\n15 W.A. Suchting, Marx and Philosophy: Three Studies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 57. 16 Gemüt is a notoriously difficult concept to translate. In Kant, as elsewhere, it signifies the human mind. soul, consciousness, spirit, disposition and body. What is evident is that Gemüt is a concept that exceeds the summation of its constituent parts, including the human [Mensch] and the understanding [Verstand]. The representative capacity of the uman’ is a clunky placeholder, but preferable to reductive and exclusive translations such asthe mind’.\n\n16","previous_page":15,"next_page":17}