{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":185,"pdf_page":189,"physical_index":189,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"cd4828617076b10de214db6791debd8f139d6e2e0b0da60c753e57571b6b1fca"},"chapter":"第四章《资本论》:思考历史的条件","content":"“总社会资本”的三个循环—一货币资本、生产资本和商品资本的循环.每一个循环都包括生产环节一一我们对第4章引言中提出的内容进行了丰富而多方面的阐述，但是，这一章的主体只是从直接生产过程的有限观点出发，即资本满足其自我扩张需要的生活。总社会资本的三个循环形成了不同但相互关联的资本“生命过程”——“生命循环”，因此代表了一个关键的，如果不是最重要的，更广泛地丰富马克思政治经济学批判中(不发达的)生命话语的手段。8托姆巴佐斯的《马克思的时间》在分析马克思作品中这一大部分未被探索的维度方面与众不同。9利用黑格尔《逻辑学》中三段论的形象(更不用说马克思对三段论的直接承认)，托姆巴佐斯展示了货币(M)之间的不同位置和关系，商品(C)和生产(P)代表了对黑格尔的批判性挪用，尽管如此，这与三段论中普遍性(U)、特殊性(P)和独特性(S)之间的不同位置和关系相对应。正如托姆巴佐斯所说，这是“资本的三段论结构”10，而且，在逻辑之后，它直接与这样一种意义相关:作为“理念”资本是一个过程的“有生命的存在”一一一个目的论的“有生命的有机体”——它在自身内部将自身分成三个processes11:(1)“有生命的个体”，或“形状”(生产资本的回路);(2)“生命过程”，或“同化”（商品资本的循环);(3)“属过程”(货币资本的循环)。马克思和黑格尔之间这种同源性的细节(在托姆巴佐斯之后所谓的“系统辩证法”的大部分工作都没有提到)不能\n\n8 The following two passages in the Grundrisse are also, quite instructive: first, Capitalexists as the subject of circulation; circulation is posited as its own life’ s course. But whilst capital thus, as the whole of circulation, is circulating capital, is the process of going from one phase into the other, it is at the same time, within each phase, posited in a specific aspect, restricted to a particular form, which is the negation of itself as the subject of the whole movement. Therefore, capital in each of its particular phases is the negation of itself as the subject of all the various metamorphoses’ ; and, second, Insofar as capital in every moment of the process is itself the possibility of going over into its other, next phase, and is thus the possibility of the whole process, which expresses capital’ s act of life, to that extent each of the moments appears potentially as capital -hence commodity capital, money capital -along with the value positing itself in the productionprocess as capital.’ Marx, Grundrisse, 620, 637. Marx' s use of the expression the life-process of capital’ (see also Capital 1, 425) cuts across his entire critique of political economy, but the second volume of Capital is arguably unmatched in its contribution to our understanding of the relation between the concept of capital and the philosophical concept of life.\n\n9 See, in particular, Tombazos, Time in Marx, ,Chapter Eleven, Capital as Syllogism' , and Chapter Twelve, \"Capital in Marx, or “Life\" in Hegel'.\n\n10 Ibid. 140.\n\n11The living being is the syllogism whose very moments are inwardly systems and syllogismsbut they are active syllogisms, or processes; and within the subjective unity of the living being they are only One process. Thus, the living being is the process of its own concluding with itself, which runs through three processes.' G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (Part I of the Éncyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze) [1817, 1830], trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, 292 (§ 217).\n\n185","previous_page":184,"next_page":186}