{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":20,"pdf_page":24,"physical_index":24,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ffe0d7457955939f7abf34eb82a4b2cbcf46107449571f7562f437b8d0638d64"},"chapter":"第一章唯物主义历史观:一种时间解读","content":"康德的批判哲学不能解释实践的时间化力量(至少马克思在《提纲》中是这样看待实践的)，因此不能作为唯物主义历史观的时间解读的哲学基础。但是黑格尔呢?是否有可能从黑格尔《精神现象学》的序言中得到提示，并声称，首先，概念必须在存在中体现自己，成为一种只能通过时间和空间存在的现象，其次，暗示存在必须使自己与概念相适应?黑格尔在把哲学和数学区分开来，把哲学和数学的非本质的、没有生命的目的从量的概念中分离出来的时候，作出了这样的论断。黑格尔与纯数学和应用数学不同，认为哲学中的时间是存在的概念本身(der daseiende 贝格里夫 selbst)。28然而，将黑格尔《贝格里夫概念》的这种功能和范围扩展到《德意志意识形态》中的唯物主义历史概念，就是超越了这种历史概念究竟是一种什么样的“概念”的界限。在《德意志意识形态》中，把一种本体论的(时间化的)力量归于对某物的思想(在这里是“历史”)，而不是把这种力量归于正在被思想的东西(例如，把“历史”作为人类需要的内在实践)。换句话说，说唯物主义的历史概念记录了(或者更确切地说，正如本论文试图做的那样，可以记录)时间和空间是由这个概念所思考的东西积极地产生的29，这是一回事，但像黑格尔那样有效地宣称，正是由于这个概念本身，才有了时间和空间。换句话说，黑格尔的“概念”与唯物主义历史观不是同一种“概念”。这里有两种不同的“概念”在起作用，因此，黑格尔的概念实际上在存在中体现了自己，并迫使这个存在变得适合它。这样看来(至少对于now30)来说)，黑格尔的概念并不是我们所需要的:将这个概念的时间化能力扩展到唯物主义的历史概念，并不像康德的模式论那样，为我们提供我们所追求的基础。我们可以从黑格尔的《现象学》(事物的构成)中学到一些东西\n\n28 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27. 'Time is the concept itself, that there is.'\" Ibid. 487. For Hegel, this is the standpoint of absolute knowing [absolute Wissen], the pure movement of self-consciousness knowing itself as self-consciousness. Time as the concept itself is a standpoint which can only ever be taken in an open historical present. Hegel does not speak of absolute knowing as a closed or achieved content. There is, in other words, no such thing for Hegel as absolute knowledge'\n\n29 This dovetails with Haver’ s argument (in specific reference to Marx' s analysis of the circulation of money in the Grundrisse) that it is not merely that circulation occurs within the putatively a priori coordinates of time and space; it is more radically the case that circulation as suchdetermines the fact that there is time and space.'  Haver, For a Communist Ontology' , 113-14.\n\n30 However, and this is the task of Chapters 3 & 4, one can make the case, as much of the literature in socalled Systematic Dialectics' has done, that Marx'’ s concept of capital' registers capital as the concept (in the Hegelian sense). The same cannot be said of 'history' : it is not this kind of concept, but rather the name of something which, as we will later examine, capital is the condition of thinking.\n\n20","previous_page":19,"next_page":21}