{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":41,"pdf_page":45,"physical_index":45,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"50cfa15190a32fc5e242d306c81a0e93cd292e81e43ce3640e184391657d4581"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特\n\n仍然存在的情况是，总体化与总体的不同之处在于，后者被总体化，而前者将自身总体化。在这个意义上，很明显，使自身总化意味着使自身时间化。\n\n人是一种社会存在物，因为他在历史上是由多个个体在相互关系中以及这些关系本身构成的。²在马克思那里，历史和人是不可分割的概念，因此对唯物史观的时间解读也必须理解为对创造历史和被历史创造的人的时间解读。这种理解是以一般的超历史的劳动概念为中介的。作为生活资料的社会生产，这是生活资料的辩证生产，劳动是一个时间化的本体论领域，因为它构成了否定的运动。与黑格尔一样，在马克思那里，否定的辩证运动是过去、现在和未来之间积极差异的第一个也是最明显的记录。但是，否定的历史地位就这样得到了保障吗?因此，否定就是历史的时间化运动吗？《德意志意识形态》提供了一种特殊的辩证法，作为历史时间的可能基础:创造满足现有需要的手段和创造新需要的辩证法。而正是通过否定，这一辩证法中的三个时间坐标才首先变得可理解，这样，现在对过去的超越就有了内在的未来。但在何种意义上，历史的时间化不仅仅关乎否定?换句话说，为了将唯物主义的历史观重构为历史时间的概念，必须用什么，或者说通过什么来思考否定？\n\n本章的命题是，只有把辩证否定与历史的总体化，也就是所有人类生命的时间的总体化联系起来，才能从唯物主义的历史概念中建构出历史时间的概念。无论是公开承认、未陈述还是否认，这种总体化都是首要的可解性\n\n' Sartre, CDR 1, 53.\n\n2 The social' is not just direct communal relations. As Marx states: ‘Social activityexist[s] by no means only in the form of some directly communal activitywhen I am active scientificallywhen I am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others, then I am social, because I am active as a human. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product\n\n-as is even the language in which the thinker is active -my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.’ Marx, OPM, 538 (EPM, 137).\n\n41","previous_page":40,"next_page":42}