{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":44,"pdf_page":48,"physical_index":48,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"69a77b645e0caa307f4f57e655351ac4984a476d7198fb3879e2300042cf258d"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"第一次历史行动)。虽然现象学上的现在不能简化为个人行动，但个人行动仍然在本体论上优先于这个现在，因为，本章坚持认为，个人行动是第一个立场，从这个立场出发，总体化及其与时间化的关系变得可以理解。因此，个人行动是最初的立足点，从这个立足点出发，时间化的存在主义结构使历史的总体化不可避免。13这就是海德格尔的《存在与时间》的重要性所在。他的此在现象学本体论(字面意思是“存在”)包括本章的前两个部分，因为这个本体论的主要目标之一是通过此在与其死亡的关系来确保个人行动的优先性。对于海德格尔来说，对这种存在的死亡的等待和期待都是不可磨灭的个人行为，这些行为奠定了这样一个事实，即“时间性”作为“关心”的本体论意义而时间化，正如我们将学到的那样，这是此在作为一个结构整体的本体论意义。14正如我们将要考察的那样，这种走向死亡的存在(尽管只是在它的“真实”模式中)是此在的历史存在的“隐藏基础”，它的“历史性”[Geschichtlichkeit].15\n\n萨特的《辩证理性批判》(以下简称《批判》)第一卷是本章最后一节的重点。《批判》对《费尔巴哈提纲》中实践的新唯物主义与《德意志意识形态》中需要的历史唯物主义之间的关系进行了存在主义解读，将辩证法系统地重构为整体化的运动本身。对于萨特来说，个人实践不仅是这种重建的本体论基础，而且也是总体化和时间化之间的实践同一性，因为正是个人实践首先揭示了“总体化”和“总体”之间的概念差异。在这个意义上，总体化是一种不断发展的综合统一活动16，而总体是这种活动的外化产物，它已经从其生产的总体化过程中被切断(尽管如此，它仍然包含在自身内部)。然而，无论是海德格尔还是萨特，这种统一的过程都不应该被理解为存在的差异状态的后续。与前一章一样(一个时刻，一种需要的存在，并没有随后跟着另一个时刻，即满足这种需要的手段的创造)，这里没有时间顺序上的连续性\n\nVolume 3 [1985], trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 23-44.\n\n13 Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, X.\n\n14 For Heidegger, care [Sorge] is the totalised manifold of existence, which he formally defines as follows: the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in (the world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).' Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1927] (hereater B), trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Collins, 1962), 237. Heidegger establishes temporality as the ontological meaning of care in § 65 of Being and Time.\n\n15 Ibid. 438.\n\n16 Sartre, CDR 1, 46.\n\n44","previous_page":43,"next_page":45}