{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":45,"pdf_page":49,"physical_index":49,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d764f2b43d2395e6dc57a88738027647401b3a5d54dcfa03b350c9284fa2c13e"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"在这里。更确切地说，按照海德格尔(德里达的差异概念也得益于海德格尔)的说法，总体化是差异的产物，是一种统一，其统一是差异的过程。对于萨特来说，这种对统一的理解奠定了总体化和时间化之间的实践同一性，因此，如前所述，时间化是过去、现在和未来之间差异的产物。17因此，总体化与时间化之间的关系是一种依赖关系:个体实践的总体化结构正是因为它产生了时间差异而实现了总体化。个人实践的总体化结构以时间化为前提，正如个人实践的时间化结构以总体化为前提一样。对萨特来说，这种依赖性是历史的主要(本体论)和次要(认识论)可解性的基础。正如我们将看到的，它也使历史化概念的建构成为可能。\n\n存在的时间化是人类现象学本体论的颠覆性核心，因为它颠覆了我们(使用海德格尔的表达)“最初和大部分”如何理解行动(Aktion,Handeln)、活动(Aktivität, Tätigkeit)和行为(Akt, Tat)本身。从这个意义上说，存在的时间化介入了代表《德意志意识形态》的原始特征的现有主张。举两个例子，它介入了阿尔都塞的论断，即《德意志意识形态》代表了马克思著作18中的“认识论断裂”和“断裂状态”，以及乔治·拉比卡的观点，即《德意志意识形态》是一个开创性的“建筑工地”，用于与马克思的前辈、同时代人和他自己进行“清理工作”和“结算”。19然而，与拉比卡将所有哲学直接还原为意识形态相反，有一种明显的可能性，即关于时间化的哲学话语实际上可能丰富唯物主义的历史概念，而这种历史概念反过来可能丰富这些话语，以至于它迫使这些话语去考虑“………男人和女人，不是在任何幻想的孤立和固定中，而是在他们在一定条件下实际的、经验上可感知的发展过程中。20正如阿尔都塞所言，《德意志意识形态》可能传达了一种“纯粹和纯粹”的愿望\n\n17 In a certain sense, the Critique allows us to grasp the difference between totalisation and totality as analogous to the difference between temporalisation and time, such that time is the exteriorised product of temporalisation, cut off from its own temporalising process, and subject to inertia. This dovetails with the doublęd meaning of the German Gegenwart as both presence and the present, and points to one dimension of Sartre' s indebtedness to Heidegger (who invokes this doubled meaning across his corpus). In addition to Sartre, Althusser relies on Heidegger on this point. See Althusser, The Errors of Classical Economics: an Outline for a Concept of Historicāl Time' , 95.\n\n18 Louis Althusser, For Marx [1965], trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1996), 33, 36.\n\n19 Georges Labica, Marxism and the Status of Philosophy [1976], trans. Kate Soper and Martin Ryle (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980), 165-72.\n\n20Marx and Engels, DI, 27 (GI, 47-8).\n\n45","previous_page":44,"next_page":46}