{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":51,"pdf_page":55,"physical_index":55,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"8237b761cd190efee446e975243789ee6865f9a0f62eed467b034f835cae70f5"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"然而，只有这种自我认识，只有此在的概念，才能保证作为先验的必然的和普遍的构成的在世界的存在。海德格尔对世界的重视是无可争议的：“…此在，就其存在而言，总是已经将自己服从于它所遇到的‘世界’，而这种服从本质上属于它的存在。 41\n\n我们现在必须解决此在与个体人类(实体)之间的关系问题，因为这个问题是任何试图在此在与马克思的人类概念之间更普遍地发展“对话框架”的基础。这篇论文认为，这个框架是海德格尔在其1949年的《人文主义信》中所称的“存在中的历史”的一个至关重要的(迄今未被探索的)方面，对海德格尔来说，在这个维度中，一方面是现象学和存在主义之间的“富有成效的对话”，另一方面是马克思主义，“第一次成为可能”。43.问题的关键—一这个框架的条件—一是《存在与时间》中此在的个体化与马克思中人的社会个体化之间可能的结合(但绝不是统一)。个体化的问题是《存在与时间》的核心:从一开始，此在就不只是或不立即表现为个体。44“在世界的存在”对主体哲学的贡献的一个关键部分是它对个体人类实体的不可约性。然而，这并不是要接受海德格尔对这一贡献的理解，即认为“在世界中存在”是一种新的主体性，因为它完全回避了“主体”这一普遍的主观主义概念。在一个层面上，此在\n\n41 Heidegger, BT, 120-21. The world is therefore something “wherein\" Dasein as an entity ,already was.' Ibid. 106. As Macquarrie and Robinson note, Heidegger s use of angewiesen ( submitted') and Angewiesenheit ( ‘submission' ) in this passage simultaneously means to assign, to allot, to depend on and to be at the mercy of something. İbid. 121.\n\n42 See David Schweickart, Heidegger and Marx: A Framework for Dialogue' , in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 229-43. Whilst individual labour does not figure in his account, Schweickart persuasively analyses how Heidegger' s critique of Marxism as a humanist (which for Heidegger = metaphysical) discourse in his 'Letter on Humanism’ enriches our understanding of liberatory praxis.\n\n43 Martin Heidegger, Letter on \"Humanism\"’ [1949], trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks [1967],, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 259. For Heidegger, since estrangement attains an essential dimension of history' in Marx, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts.' Ibid.\n\n44 Consider the following passage: Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible character whic an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’ s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation.' Heidegger, BT, 62.\n\n45 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic [1928], trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 195. See as well Einar Øverenget, Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 103. In the Leibniz lectures, Heidegger problematically reads the traņscendental subject in Kant, and the a priori which it activates, as worldless', so as to clear space for 'being-in-the-world[to] fundamentally transform the concept[s] of subjectivity and…the subjective.' Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 195.\n\n51","previous_page":50,"next_page":52}