{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":52,"pdf_page":56,"physical_index":56,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"cedb870399c4857be8a0d05dbb450917898352ae9a1cce73653a557a09b60144"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"不是一个实体的(现在在手边的)，思考的“我的东西”[Ichding];它不是一个(传统的)笛卡儿式的主题。但在另一个层面上，它必须是这个主体。按照海德格尔自己的说法，它必须是这个个人的概念，与(可以这么说)一般的、个人主义的“个人”的概念相一致。正如我们将看到的，即使海德格尔将存在与时间创造为一体，这也不一定是一个问题。世界中的存在不是孤立于“世界历史事件”(weltgeschichtliches Geschehen)之外的“原始存在”，但海德格尔排除了这种事件的本体论结构可能(并且按照他自己的说法需要)结构seinsage本身(一般存在的意义问题)的可能性。首先，这里的问题是，世界历史事件的本体论结构(在马克思和海德格尔那里一样)构成了孤立的和异化的—一也就是说，“共同的”——个体的存在。\n\n与威廉·狄尔泰的“生命联系”类似，《存在与时间》中预先给出的是此在的在世界中存在，而不是它的个体化存在(就其本身而言，胡塞尔在《欧洲科学和先验现象学的危机》(1936)中预先给出的“生活世界”源自海德格尔的“世界”)。在世界中的存在在本体论上先于个人;只有从“在世界中存在”开始，此在作为一个个体才有可能。在海德格尔那里，将此在呈现为一个先前存在的个体，就是将它呈现为最初的当下，这是一个与Lukács在《历史与阶级意识》(1923)中的立场相呼应的谬论，即“个体主体”非常简单地是社会关系的普遍化物化的产物。46事实上，美国分析传统中的许多学者也坚持认为，此在不能被简化为离散的人类实体，换句话说，对于每个人来说，没有“独立和独特的此在”。在对日常此在的“谁”的分析中，查尔斯·吉尼翁强调了海德格尔的主张，即此在“不是自我中心的人，也不是孤立的个体”。《48对吉尼翁》在对日常存在的描述中，出现的是一幅更接近狄尔泰的此在的画面\n\n46 Highlighting § 10 and § 83 in Being and Time, where Heidegger explicitly discusses the reification of consciousness, Lucien Goldmann provocatively suggests that Being and Time is a direct (and yet unacknowledged) response to Lukács’ s History and Class Consciousness. Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy [1973], trans. William Q. Boelhower (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 27-39. Goldmann'\"s understanding of Heidegger is suspect, but it is certainly possible that Heidegger’ s derivation of thepresent-at-hand’ from the ready-to-hand' could be crossread with Lukács’ s account of reification as yielded by the instrumental rationality of capitalist social relations.\n\n47 John Haugeland, Truth and Finitude: Heidegger' s Transcendental Existentialism' , in Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honour ofHubert L. Dreyfus, Vol. 1, ed. Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000), 46.\n\n48 Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz [1928], in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 2: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 172.\n\n52","previous_page":51,"next_page":53}