{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":53,"pdf_page":57,"physical_index":57,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"9bf76c34b7efda852c7d0784a3a43d985381480197d7eefd0a95ad368533318d"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"相对于笛卡儿式的主体或单子而言，“客观心灵”的概念是不存在的……“此在”没有复数形式，海德格尔也很少提到“一个此在”。“此在”不是一个适用于特定个体的“计数名词”，而更像是一个“质量名词”。它抓住了“清除”可理解性的概念，这种可理解性可以更恰当地理解为一种文化总体，而不是个人的集合。卡罗尔怀特坚持认为，此在首先是我们所有人的实体:它是我们所共有的东西。在这个意义上，按照马克思的说法，个人是此在的承担者一一人格化。此在与人之间的关系是“图形本体论的”：“我们是实体，通过它‘存在’……被揭示，因此我们是‘存在’……被揭示的地方。50这里的结构主义色彩是显而易见的。怀特将此在个体化的主要误读归因于翻译。她明确地批评了麦夸里和罗宾逊对海德格尔的集体单数术语“das Seiende'(实体或什么)的持续多元化。因此，“das Seiende……·sind wir je selbst”变成了“我们自已就是实体”，“das Sein des Seienden”变成了“实体的存在”。51.对怀特来说，此在的个体化意味着将此在与其他存在的领域区分开来，这样它的存在就不会与其他实体的存在相混淆。个体化是此在的存在自我作为自身的构成，从根本上定位了此在的“在”。只有由于这种个体化，一个个体才能与另一个个体区分开来。因此，是否有可能提出，此在最初是一个社会实体，而不是个人实体？\n\n这些都是对海德格尔的令人信服的解读，但它们必须与海德格尔将此在作为一个社会实体的构成相一致，这样一个个体的此在(ein einzelnesDasein)——一个在存在与时间中明确出现的实体——遇到海德格尔所说的“他者”。从表面上看，《存在与时间》中很少出现“社会”的范畴。在“谁”是此在的日常性的问题的催化下，海德格尔提出了与“在世界的存在”(being-In-)具有“同等原创性”的两种存在：“存在-”\n\n49 Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 104.\n\n50 Carol J. White, Dasein, Existence, and Death' , in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity, and Death, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), 333.\n\n51 Ibid. 332. Emphasis aded. Macquarrie and Robinson frequently interject one' and one’ s’ into their translation where one’ [man] and one’ s’ [eigenen] do not appear in the German original, effectively compelling the English-language reader to comprehend Dasein as only an individual aņd not also a transindividual entity, To name two examples:. einen Ausstand an Seinkönnen' becomes somethiņg still outstanding in one’ s. potentiality-for-Being' (Heidegger, BT, 279) and Endlichkeit der Existenz' becomes finitude of one' s existence' (ibid. 435). However, it is crucial to ņote that one' and one s’ regularly appear in Heidegger’ s analysis of Dasein’ s sociality. Thus Mitsein ist eine Bestimmtheit des je eigenen Daseins’ is accurately rendered as Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own Dasein' (ibid. 157). Emphases added.\n\n53","previous_page":52,"next_page":54}