{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":54,"pdf_page":58,"physical_index":58,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"a816356c885f3516c09b72fbe75feab20de45913f20a9847a1059c0ddde31c59"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"with'和'在因'。52对海德格尔来说，在世界中的存在就是与他人的存在：“世界永远是我与他人分享的世界。”在因的世界是一个有世界。53他者是属世的实体。它们面对的是“设备的环境背景”，是“为了什么”的结构，它将世界作为一个所指行动的指涉总体。换句话说，与他者的相遇基本上是由海德格尔所指定的“现成的”所实现的，这种实体的本质存在(“现成的”)是由世界内部的“分配”或“参与”来定义的。现成的不是通过成为空间中的有形物体(这是现在-在手)来定义的，而是通过它与世界的实践关系来定义的。这就引出了海德格尔对他者的正式定义:\n\n我们所说的“他者”不是指所有的其余者，而是指我一一那些与“我”相对立的人。更确切地说，他们是那些在大多数情况下，一个人无法与之区别开来的人一—那些人也与之相异的人。这种与他们在一起的“也在那里”并不具有与他们在一个世界中“一起”在场的存在的本体论特征。这个\"有\"是具有在因的性质的东西;而“太”则意味着存在的一种同一性，即审慎地关注于世界中的存在。54\n\n这段话表达了在因存在核心的复杂社会性。作为一种存在分析，在因作为一种特殊的“超个体个体化”，代表了社会的一种早期本体论。55具体来说，在因的社会性是一种双重个体化:继怀特之后，它将在因与实体的其他领域区分开来(只有在因，既不是现成的，也不是手边的，才能够与之存在)，但这只是因为，与怀特相反，这种社会性将一个个体在因与另一个个体区分开来，“在大多数情况下”是不可区分的。手边的东西和手边的东西都不能成为社会的东西，但是，与在因不同，它们在世界内部是有根本区别的。这里存在着世界的一个至关重要的维度，并且将海德格尔推向比他所提供的更远的地方，即现成的世界内部:它限制了在因大体上未分化的社会性\n\n52 Ibid. 149. § 26 of Being and Time, The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with’, has been widely commentated on and is crucial to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida and Roberto Esposito.\n\n53Ibid. 155. As he puts it a bit later: So far as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as its kind of being.' Ibid. 163.\n\n54Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927] (hereafer SZ), in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung 1: Veröffentliche Šchriften 1914-1970, Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 158 (BT, 154).\n\n55 The notion of transindividual individuation' has recently gained currency in the Anglo-American academy, primarily due to a growing reception of Gilbert Simondon and his commentators. See, for instance, Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual [1999], trans. Thomas LaMarre (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2013). For readings of Marx which draw on Simondon, see Luca Basso, Marx and Singularity: from the Early Writings to the Grundrisse [2008], trans. Arianna Bove (Leiden/Boston/ Cologne: Brilī, 2012), as well as Jason Read, The Production of Subjectivity: from Transindividuality to the Commons' , New Formations 70 (Winter 2011), 113-31.\n\n54","previous_page":53,"next_page":55}