{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":57,"pdf_page":61,"physical_index":61,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ea1259b37339cc822962902e8a31b06bf87e18dfd19081a94f735dbc96c73c51"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"为了自我实现。因此，正如他所说，劳动不可避免地是“累赘的”：“在劳动中，首先是事物本身的问题，而不是劳动者的问题，即使在劳动和劳动产品’还没有完全分离的时候也是如此。”在劳动中，人总是被带离自身而走向他物:他总是和他者在一起，为他者而存在。“3.马尔库塞段落中的“物”，在马克思中既是劳动的产物，又是其他劳动者，在海德格尔中既是现成的存在，又是“他者”，这是必要的。这就是海德格尔的关怀概念与马克思的相关性。关怀将他者“抛出”他者的“位置”，并支配他所关心的东西。“4海德格尔承认关心是一种依赖关系，而且，在一个罕见的政治经济洞察力时刻，一种“为同一件事而被雇佣的人彼此之间的存在……只在不信任中茁壮成长。”65虽然他从未建立这种联系，但关怀(在其冷漠和有缺陷的模式中)是作为一种有形事物的他者的客观化。“二”可能“与此在本身一样少的临在”，然而“与我们在一起的那些实体的存在”被认为是临在。 66\n\n将马克思和海德格尔之间的对话转换为时间哲学，现在需要对此在的结构整体[Ganze]进行研究。在存在与时间的第一次划分结束时，“关心”(Sorge)作为存在的整体杂多出现，同时将存在重新塑造为“存在性”。注意的正式定义如下：“此在的存在意味着先于自身存在于(世界)之中，即与(在世界中遇到的实体)在一起。”67对海德格尔来说，存在、真实性和堕落是此在的本体论特征，它们“编织”了关怀的原始语境，揭示和真理一一以及它们通过话语和语言的表达一一本质上属于这个语境。68如前所述，存在是由理解构成的，并且\n\n63 Herbert Marcuse, On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics’, [1933] trans. John Abromeit, in Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, 130. Douglas Kellner also translates this essay in Telos 16 (Summer 1973), 9-37. There is clearly an ontological individualism in this essay.\n\n64 Heidegger, BT, 158, 161. This is misleadingly characterised as an extreme possibility’ of solicitude, but in fact constitutes the phenomenological core of its indifferent' and deficient' modes.\n\n65 Ibid. 159.\n\n66 Ibid. 166, 168.\n\n67 Ibid. 237.\n\n68 If disclosedness (understanding, disposedness, falling) maintains its articulation through discourse' (Heidegger, SZ, 461/BT, 400), and if discourse is existentially equi-originary with disposedness and understaning' (Heidegger, SZ, 213/BT, 203), is it justifiable to suggest that, ęven if discourse in itself is temporal,'. it does not temporalise itself primarily in any definite ecstasis' (Heidegger, BT, 400)? Is Heidegger’ s transposition (as we will later consider) of understanding as the future, disposedness as beenness, and falling as making present not woven together with an ecstasis (if not a emporality) specific to Articulation itself? It never made its way into the final manuscript, but Heidegger' s temporalisation of language and speech in the first draft' of Being and Time addresses this. See Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time (The First Draft of Being and Time) [1924], trans. Ingo Farin (London: Continuum, 2011), 63. This text should not be confused with his Marburg Theological\n\n57","previous_page":56,"next_page":58}