{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","id":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","uuid":"b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title":"Marx and the Concept of Historical Time","normalized_title":"marxandtheconceptofhistoricaltime","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":null,"isbns":[],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":200,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Marx%20and%20the%20Concept%20of%20Historical%20Time","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/b1ad407a-d523-4f8b-bd50-238767f146d6/search"},"page":{"printed_page":58,"pdf_page":62,"physical_index":62,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ff58307920792225312feb2dd8317d923efa8fe4de150c5d5328d9a4a67e3361"},"chapter":"第二章总体性、时间化与历史:海德格尔与萨特","content":"而将来的能力则是由对可能性的投射和对这些可能性的解释(“设计”)构成的。真实性是此在的情感决定性。它不是一种当下事物的野蛮的“事实性”，而是一种现实性，这种现实性以一种“意向性”为标志，它揭示了此在本质上的“弃置性”。存在的事实，既没有解决，也没有完成，抛弃表明，此在已经总是被“交付”给在世界的存在，即使，事实上，正是因为，此在“最初和大部分”回避了这一事实。“坠落”充实了海德格尔的关怀概念。如果存在是“先行存在”的领域，而事实性是“已经存在于世界”的领域，那么坠落就是在世界内部遇到的实体的“在旁边存在”或“在中间存在”。下落是由闲言碎语、好奇和模棱两可构成的。作为存在于世，它也是诱惑、宁静和隔阂(坠落是《存在与时间》中唯一表述的隔阂)。让人想起马克思的“私有属性的基本前提”，即人类“只是为了拥有而生产”的事实，对海德格尔来说，堕落是一种“向下的跳水”，其“平静的假设”是“它拥有一切……一切都是可以达到的”。70.与“一”的社会性直接相关的存在的，因此，堕落是进入海德格尔的两种存在模式的主要切入点:真实性(authenticity)/所有权(Eigentlichkeit)和非真实性(inauthenticity)/未知(Uneigentlichkeit)，后者并不是(据说)从前者的更纯粹、更高的状态中堕落出来，而是一种对世界和一的本体论上的基本迷恋，是此在(Dasein)的“无我”(not-being-itself)的积极可能性。71\n\nlectures of the same year: Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time [1924], trans. William McNeill (Malden/ Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell, 1992).\n\n69 Marx, JM, 274. See also Kostas Axelos, Alienation, Praxis, and Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx [1969], trans. Ronald Bruzina (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 123-42.\n\n70 Heidegger, BT, 223.\n\n71 Ibid. 220. It is difficult to accept Hedegger' s argument that falling does not express any negative evaluation.’ Ibid. As he expresses it:wemisunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if weascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves.’ Ibid. For an attempt to move past this strict separation between the ontic and the ontological, to think affinities between inauthenticity in Heidegger and alienation in Marx, see Anne F. Pomeroy, 'Remythologizing Heidegger: Capitalism,Time,and Authenticity' , Φλoσoφα(Philosophia): International Journal of Philosophy 37:2 (2008), 119-38.\n\n58","previous_page":57,"next_page":59}